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Verified Commit 78954705 authored by Max Rees's avatar Max Rees
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system/python3: bump to 3.6.10 and patch CVE-2019-18348 (#232)

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1 merge request!411CVE patches for 2020.03.16
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system/python3/APKBUILD
+ 9
− 6
View file @ 78954705
# Contributor: Kiyoshi Aman <adelie@aerdan.vulpine.house>
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=python3
pkgver=3.6.9
pkgver=3.6.10
_basever="${pkgver%.*}"
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="A high-level scripting language"
......@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ makedepends="expat-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev ncurses-dev bzip2-dev xz-dev
source="https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$pkgver/Python-$pkgver.tar.xz
musl-find_library.patch
fix-xattrs-glibc.patch
CVE-2019-16056.patch
CVE-2019-16935.patch
CVE-2019-18348.patch
"
builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver"
......@@ -63,6 +62,8 @@ builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver"
# - CVE-2019-16056
# 3.6.9-r2:
# - CVE-2019-16935
# 3.6.10-r0:
# - CVE-2019-18348
prepare() {
default_prepare
......@@ -153,11 +154,14 @@ EOF
}
package() {
export XDG_CACHE_HOME="$(mktemp -d)"
make -j1 DESTDIR="$pkgdir" EXTRA_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" install maninstall
install -Dm644 LICENSE "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE
# those are provided by python3-tkinter
rm -r "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/idle* "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/idlelib \
"$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/tkinter
rm -rf "$XDG_CACHE_HOME"
}
dev() {
......@@ -189,8 +193,7 @@ wininst() {
"$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/python$_basever/distutils/command
}
sha512sums="05de9c6f44d96a52bfce10ede4312de892573edaf8bece65926d19973a3a800d65eed7a857af945f69efcfb25efa3788e7a54016b03d80b611eb51c3ea074819 Python-3.6.9.tar.xz
sha512sums="26147099e1f1a0ffc85febad26e18e991f019599a150887ea0b925e34663fad8e03b3c2a941e2770c1a63960695e173ef32709572c9361e7f2cb862ccf75b28a Python-3.6.10.tar.xz
ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2 musl-find_library.patch
37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad fix-xattrs-glibc.patch
1f1eb61355eb7832bef8e9c3915895cc3b2966a30c809371430b4416260452cd39c48ba593b2259574867bd1e8fea98efbc45c4b0bd95aeb0690c8514b380ea0 CVE-2019-16056.patch
7f94d887c81f79d90afd4a9621547c13cbdd0232250f62a686b26a63160a4d286a6db9b342d06b9b63af64f994835b489c37bab499a2093c3c2585dc7a04d8a1 CVE-2019-16935.patch"
7a15409165feb60358455b711f978b7b1c4dea9ad53aa7b5be07c1f70262988e592e7a630f83125f37051bbed14d14b66d2acd775234a163ff5b048621b9a59c CVE-2019-18348.patch"
system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 131
View file @ 44858d97
From 13a19139b5e76175bc95294d54afc9425e4f36c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 08:22:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-34155: Dont parse domains containing @ (GH-13079)
(GH-14826)
Before:
>>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses
(Address(display_name='', username='a', domain='malicious.org'),)
>>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com')
('', 'a@malicious.org')
After:
>>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses
(Address(display_name='', username='', domain=''),)
>>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com')
('', 'a@')
https://bugs.python.org/issue34155
(cherry picked from commit 8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9)
Co-authored-by: jpic <jpic@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py | 2 ++
Lib/email/_parseaddr.py | 11 ++++++++++-
Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py | 10 ++++++++++
Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py | 14 ++++++++++++++
.../2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst | 1 +
5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
diff --git a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
index 737951e4b1b1..bc9c9b6241d4 100644
--- a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
@@ -1561,6 +1561,8 @@ def get_domain(value):
token, value = get_dot_atom(value)
except errors.HeaderParseError:
token, value = get_atom(value)
+ if value and value[0] == '@':
+ raise errors.HeaderParseError('Invalid Domain')
if leader is not None:
token[:0] = [leader]
domain.append(token)
diff --git a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
index cdfa3729adc7..41ff6f8c000d 100644
--- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
@@ -379,7 +379,12 @@ def getaddrspec(self):
aslist.append('@')
self.pos += 1
self.gotonext()
- return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain()
+ domain = self.getdomain()
+ if not domain:
+ # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a
+ # local part to denote failed parsing.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
+ return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain
def getdomain(self):
"""Get the complete domain name from an address."""
@@ -394,6 +399,10 @@ def getdomain(self):
elif self.field[self.pos] == '.':
self.pos += 1
sdlist.append('.')
+ elif self.field[self.pos] == '@':
+ # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like
+ # `a@malicious.org@important.com`.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends:
break
else:
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
index a2c900fa7fd2..02ef3e1006c6 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
@@ -1418,6 +1418,16 @@ def test_get_addr_spec_dot_atom(self):
self.assertEqual(addr_spec.domain, 'example.com')
self.assertEqual(addr_spec.addr_spec, 'star.a.star@example.com')
+ def test_get_addr_spec_multiple_domains(self):
+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@a.star@example.com')
+
+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@a@example.com')
+
+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@172.17.0.1@example.com')
+
# get_obs_route
def test_get_obs_route_simple(self):
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
index f97ccc6711cc..68d052279987 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
@@ -3035,6 +3035,20 @@ def test_parseaddr_empty(self):
self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', ''))
self.assertEqual(utils.formataddr(utils.parseaddr('<>')), '')
+ def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self):
+ self.assertEqual(
+ utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+
def test_noquote_dump(self):
self.assertEqual(
utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')),
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..50292e29ed1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic.
system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 80
View file @ 44858d97
From 1698cacfb924d1df452e78d11a4bf81ae7777389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2019 09:33:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38243, xmlrpc.server: Escape the server_title (GH-16373)
(GH-16441)
Escape the server title of xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer
when rendering the document page as HTML.
(cherry picked from commit e8650a4f8c7fb76f570d4ca9c1fbe44e91c8dfaa)
---
Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++
Lib/xmlrpc/server.py | 3 ++-
.../2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst | 3 +++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
index 00903337c07c2..d2adb21af0fb3 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
from xmlrpc.server import DocXMLRPCServer
import http.client
+import re
import sys
from test import support
threading = support.import_module('threading')
@@ -193,6 +194,21 @@ def test_annotations(self):
b'method_annotation</strong></a>(x: bytes)</dt></dl>'),
response.read())
+ def test_server_title_escape(self):
+ # bpo-38243: Ensure that the server title and documentation
+ # are escaped for HTML.
+ self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>')
+ self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>')
+ self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title)
+ self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>',
+ self.serv.server_documentation)
+
+ generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation()
+ title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group()
+ documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group()
+ self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title&lt;script&gt;</title>', title)
+ self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation&lt;script&gt;</tt></p>', documentation)
+
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()
diff --git a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
index 3e0dca027f068..efe593748968c 100644
--- a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
+++ b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ def export_add(self, x, y):
from xmlrpc.client import Fault, dumps, loads, gzip_encode, gzip_decode
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
+import html
import http.server
import socketserver
import sys
@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ def generate_html_documentation(self):
methods
)
- return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation)
+ return documenter.page(html.escape(self.server_title), documentation)
class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
"""XML-RPC and documentation request handler class.
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..98d7be129573a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Escape the server title of :class:`xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer`
+when rendering the document page as HTML.
+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.)
system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch 0 → 100644
+ 147
− 0
View file @ 78954705
From 83fc70159b24f5b11a5ef87c9b05c2cf4c7faeba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:35:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38576: Disallow control characters in hostnames in
http.client (GH-18995) (GH-19002)
Add host validation for control characters for more CVE-2019-18348 protection.
(cherry picked from commit 9165addc22d05e776a54319a8531ebd0b2fe01ef)
Co-authored-by: Ashwin Ramaswami <aramaswamis@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/client.py | 10 ++++++
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 13 ++++++-
Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 36 +++++++++++++++++--
.../2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst | 1 +
4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index d4821f1a96e07..c0ac7db6f40a0 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -858,6 +858,8 @@ def __init__(self, host, port=None, timeout=socket._GLOBAL_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
(self.host, self.port) = self._get_hostport(host, port)
+ self._validate_host(self.host)
+
# This is stored as an instance variable to allow unit
# tests to replace it with a suitable mockup
self._create_connection = socket.create_connection
@@ -1215,6 +1217,14 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
+ def _validate_host(self, host):
+ """Validate a host so it doesn't contain control characters."""
+ # Prevent CVE-2019-18348.
+ match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(host)
+ if match:
+ raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {host!r} "
+ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
+
def putheader(self, header, *values):
"""Send a request header line to the server.
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index 14d42d483773c..fcd9231666ede 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ def run_server():
thread.join()
self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n")
- def test_putrequest_override_validation(self):
+ def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self):
"""
It should be possible to override the default validation
behavior in putrequest (bpo-38216).
@@ -1145,6 +1145,17 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
conn.putrequest('GET', '/\x00')
+ def test_putrequest_override_host_validation(self):
+ class UnsafeHTTPConnection(client.HTTPConnection):
+ def _validate_host(self, url):
+ pass
+
+ conn = UnsafeHTTPConnection('example.com\r\n')
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ # set skip_host so a ValueError is not raised upon adding the
+ # invalid URL as the value of the "Host:" header
+ conn.putrequest('GET', '/', skip_host=1)
+
def test_putrequest_override_encoding(self):
"""
It should be possible to override the default encoding
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
index 0061a5297cb35..ddf425fd8d4b5 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def test_willclose(self):
self.unfakehttp()
@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
- def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+ def test_url_path_with_control_char_rejected(self):
for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
char = chr(char_no)
schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/"
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
self.unfakehttp()
@unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
- def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+ def test_url_path_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
@@ -383,6 +383,38 @@ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
finally:
self.unfakehttp()
+ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+ def test_url_host_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+ for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
+ char = chr(char_no)
+ schemeless_url = f"//localhost{char}/test/"
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ try:
+ escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
+ InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+ InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
+ urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
+ urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
+ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+ def test_url_host_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ host = "localhost\r\nX-injected: header\r\n"
+ schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+ try:
+ InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+ InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"):
+ urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
+ urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
def test_read_0_9(self):
# "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
# a status line)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..34b8af28988fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Disallow control characters in hostnames in http.client, addressing CVE-2019-18348. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised.
\ No newline at end of file
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