ceph_frame_desc::fd_lens is an int array.  decode_preamble() thus
effectively casts u32 -> int but the checks for segment lengths are
written as if on unsigned values.  While reading in HELLO or one of the
AUTH frames (before authentication is completed), arithmetic in
head_onwire_len() can get duped by negative ctrl_len and produce
head_len which is less than CEPH_PREAMBLE_LEN but still positive.
This would lead to a buffer overrun in prepare_read_control() as the
preamble gets copied to the newly allocated buffer of size head_len.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd1a677c ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Reported-by: Thelford Williams <thelford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>

Lion says:
-------
In the QFQ scheduler a similar issue to CVE-2023-31436
persists.

Consider the following code in net/sched/sch_qfq.c:

static int qfq_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
                struct sk_buff **to_free)
{
     unsigned int len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb), gso_segs;

    // ...

     if (unlikely(cl->agg->lmax < len)) {
         pr_debug("qfq: increasing maxpkt from %u to %u for class %u",
              cl->agg->lmax, len, cl->common.classid);
         err = qfq_change_agg(sch, cl, cl->agg->class_weight, len);
         if (err) {
             cl->qstats.drops++;
             return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
         }

    // ...

     }

Similarly to CVE-2023-31436, "lmax" is increased without any bounds
checks according to the packet length "len". Usually this would not
impose a problem because packet sizes are naturally limited.

This is however not the actual packet length, rather the
"qdisc_pkt_len(skb)" which might apply size transformations according to
"struct qdisc_size_table" as created by "qdisc_get_stab()" in
net/sched/sch_api.c if the TCA_STAB option was set when modifying the qdisc.

A user may choose virtually any size using such a table.

As a result the same issue as in CVE-2023-31436 can occur, allowing heap
out-of-bounds read / writes in the kmalloc-8192 cache.
-------

We can create the issue with the following commands:

tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1: stab mtu 2048 tsize 512 mpu 0 \
overhead 999999999 linklayer ethernet qfq
tc class add dev $DEV parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate 6mbit burst 15k
tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1: matchall classid 1:1
ping -I $DEV 1.1.1.2

This is caused by incorrectly assuming that qdisc_pkt_len() returns a
length within the QFQ_MIN_LMAX < len < QFQ_MAX_LMAX.

Fixes: 462dbc91 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost")
Reported-by: Lion <nnamrec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

25369891 deletes a check for the case where no 'lmax' is
specified which 30379334 previously fixed as 'lmax'
could be set to the device's MTU without any bound checking
for QFQ_LMAX_MIN and QFQ_LMAX_MAX. Therefore, reintroduce the check.

Fixes: 25369891 ("net/sched: sch_qfq: refactor parsing of netlink parameters")
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Fix ethernet header length field after stripping the mesh header

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CT5GNZSK28AI.2K6M69OXM9RW5@syracuse/


Fixes: 986e43b1 ("wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces")
Reported-and-tested-by: Nicolas Escande <nico.escande@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230711115052.68430-1-nbd@nbd.name


Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

The kernel does not currently validate that both the minimum and maximum
ports of a port range are specified. This can lead user space to think
that a filter matching on a port range was successfully added, when in
fact it was not. For example, with a patched (buggy) iproute2 that only
sends the minimum port, the following commands do not return an error:

 # tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1 proto ip flower ip_proto udp src_port 100-200 action pass

 # tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1 proto ip flower ip_proto udp dst_port 100-200 action pass

 # tc filter show dev swp1 ingress
 filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0
 filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0 handle 0x1
   eth_type ipv4
   ip_proto udp
   not_in_hw
         action order 1: gact action pass
          random type none pass val 0
          index 1 ref 1 bind 1

 filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0 handle 0x2
   eth_type ipv4
   ip_proto udp
   not_in_hw
         action order 1: gact action pass
          random type none pass val 0
          index 2 ref 1 bind 1

Fix by returning an error unless both ports are specified:

 # tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1 proto ip flower ip_proto udp src_port 100-200 action pass
 Error: Both min and max source ports must be specified.
 We have an error talking to the kernel

 # tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1 proto ip flower ip_proto udp dst_port 100-200 action pass
 Error: Both min and max destination ports must be specified.
 We have an error talking to the kernel

Fixes: 5c72299f ("net: sched: cls_flower: Classify packets using port ranges")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, verifier does not reject XDP programs that pass NULL pointer to
hints functions. At the same time, this case is not handled in any driver
implementation (including veth). For example, changing

bpf_xdp_metadata_rx_timestamp(ctx, &timestamp);

to

bpf_xdp_metadata_rx_timestamp(ctx, NULL);

in xdp_metadata test successfully crashes the system.

Add KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag to hints kfunc definitions, so driver code
does not have to worry about getting invalid pointers.

Fixes: 3d76a4d3 ("bpf: XDP metadata RX kfuncs")
Reported-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZKWo0BbpLfkZHbyE@google.com/


Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230711105930.29170-1-larysa.zaremba@intel.com


Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().

Direct replacement is safe here since return value of -errno
is used to check for truncation instead of sizeof(dest).

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89



Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now in addrconf_mod_rs_timer(), reference idev depends on whether
rs_timer is not pending. Then modify rs_timer timeout.

There is a time gap in [1], during which if the pending rs_timer
becomes not pending. It will miss to hold idev, but the rs_timer
is activated. Thus rs_timer callback function addrconf_rs_timer()
will be executed and put idev later without holding idev. A refcount
underflow issue for idev can be caused by this.

	if (!timer_pending(&idev->rs_timer))
		in6_dev_hold(idev);
		  <--------------[1]
	mod_timer(&idev->rs_timer, jiffies + when);

To fix the issue, hold idev if mod_timer() return 0.

Fixes: b7b1bfce ("ipv6: split duplicate address detection and router solicitation timer")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Amit Klein reported that udp6_ehash_secret was initialized but never used.

Fixes: 1bbdceef ("inet: convert inet_ehash_secret and ipv6_hash_secret to net_get_random_once")
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With some IPv6 Ext Hdr (RPL, SRv6, etc.), we can send a packet that
has the link-local address as src and dst IP and will be forwarded to
an external IP in the IPv6 Ext Hdr.

For example, the script below generates a packet whose src IP is the
link-local address and dst is updated to 11::.

  # for f in $(find /proc/sys/net/ -name *seg6_enabled*); do echo 1 > $f; done
  # python3
  >>> from socket import *
  >>> from scapy.all import *
  >>>
  >>> SRC_ADDR = DST_ADDR = "fe80::5054:ff:fe12:3456"
  >>>
  >>> pkt = IPv6(src=SRC_ADDR, dst=DST_ADDR)
  >>> pkt /= IPv6ExtHdrSegmentRouting(type=4, addresses=["11::", "22::"], segleft=1)
  >>>
  >>> sk = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)
  >>> sk.sendto(bytes(pkt), (DST_ADDR, 0))

For such a packet, we call ip6_route_input() to look up a route for the
next destination in these three functions depending on the header type.

  * ipv6_rthdr_rcv()
  * ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv()
  * ipv6_srh_rcv()

If no route is found, ip6_null_entry is set to skb, and the following
dst_input(skb) calls ip6_pkt_drop().

Finally, in icmp6_dev(), we dereference skb_rt6_info(skb)->rt6i_idev->dev
as the input device is the loopback interface.  Then, we have to check if
skb_rt6_info(skb)->rt6i_idev is NULL or not to avoid NULL pointer deref
for ip6_null_entry.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 157 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.4.0-11996-gb121d614371c #35
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:icmp6_send (net/ipv6/icmp.c:436 net/ipv6/icmp.c:503)
Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 40 30 c0 86 5d 83 e8 c6 44 1c 00 e9 c8 fc ff ff 49 8b 46 58 48 83 e0 fe 0f 84 4a fb ff ff 48 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 00 44 8b 88 e0 00 00 00 e9 34 fb ff ff 4d 85 ed 0f 85 69 01
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000003c70 EFLAGS: 00000286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00000000000000e0
RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888006d72a18
RBP: ffffc90000003d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffc90000003d98 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff888006d72a10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880057fb800 R15: ffffffff835d86c0
FS:  00007f9dc72ee740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000057b2000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ip6_pkt_drop (net/ipv6/route.c:4513)
 ipv6_rthdr_rcv (net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:640 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:686)
 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:437 (discriminator 5))
 ip6_input_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483)
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5455)
 process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 net/core/dev.c:5895)
 __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6460)
 net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6529 net/core/dev.c:6660)
 __do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:207 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:554)
 do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:454 kernel/softirq.c:441)
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:381)
 __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4231)
 ip6_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:544 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:135)
 rawv6_sendmsg (./include/net/dst.h:458 ./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 net/ipv6/raw.c:656 net/ipv6/raw.c:914)
 sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:725 net/socket.c:748)
 __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2134)
 __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2146 net/socket.c:2142 net/socket.c:2142)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
RIP: 0033:0x7f9dc751baea
Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffe98712c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe98712cf8 RCX: 00007f9dc751baea
RDX: 0000000000000060 RSI: 00007f9dc6460b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9dc56e8be0 R08: 00007ffe98712d70 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f9dc6af5d1b
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:icmp6_send (net/ipv6/icmp.c:436 net/ipv6/icmp.c:503)
Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 40 30 c0 86 5d 83 e8 c6 44 1c 00 e9 c8 fc ff ff 49 8b 46 58 48 83 e0 fe 0f 84 4a fb ff ff 48 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 00 44 8b 88 e0 00 00 00 e9 34 fb ff ff 4d 85 ed 0f 85 69 01
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000003c70 EFLAGS: 00000286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00000000000000e0
RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888006d72a18
RBP: ffffc90000003d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffc90000003d98 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff888006d72a10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880057fb800 R15: ffffffff835d86c0
FS:  00007f9dc72ee740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000057b2000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Kernel Offset: disabled

Fixes: 4832c30d ("net: ipv6: put host and anycast routes on device with address")
Reported-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c41403a9-c2f6-3b7e-0c96-e1901e605cd0@huawei.com/


Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Ian reported several skb corruptions triggered by rx-gro-list,
collecting different oops alike:

[   62.624003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
[   62.631083] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   62.636312] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   62.641541] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   62.644174] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   62.648629] CPU: 1 PID: 913 Comm: napi/eno2-79 Not tainted 6.4.0 #364
[   62.655162] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/A2SDi-12C-HLN4F, BIOS 1.7a 10/13/2022
[   62.663344] RIP: 0010:__udp_gso_segment (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2858
./include/linux/udp.h:23 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:228 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:261
net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:277)
[   62.687193] RSP: 0018:ffffbd3a83b4f868 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   62.692515] RAX: 00000000000000ce RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   62.699743] RDX: ffffa124def8a000 RSI: 0000000000000079 RDI: ffffa125952a14d4
[   62.706970] RBP: ffffa124def8a000 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 00002000001558c9
[   62.714199] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000be554639 R12: 00000000000000e2
[   62.721426] R13: ffffa125952a1400 R14: ffffa125952a1400 R15: 00002000001558c9
[   62.728654] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa127efa40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   62.736852] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   62.742702] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 00000001034b0000 CR4: 00000000003526e0
[   62.749948] Call Trace:
[   62.752498]  <TASK>
[   62.779267] inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1398)
[   62.787605] skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gro.c:141)
[   62.791906] __skb_gso_segment (net/core/dev.c:3403 (discriminator 2))
[   62.800492] validate_xmit_skb (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4862
net/core/dev.c:3659)
[   62.804695] validate_xmit_skb_list (net/core/dev.c:3710)
[   62.809158] sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:330)
[   62.813198] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3805 net/core/dev.c:4210)
net/netfilter/core.c:626)
[   62.821093] br_dev_queue_push_xmit (net/bridge/br_forward.c:55)
[   62.825652] maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:193)
[   62.829420] br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:233)
[   62.832758] br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:215)
[   62.837403] br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:298
net/bridge/br_input.c:416)
[   62.851417] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:5387)
[   62.866114] __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5570)
[   62.871367] netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5638
net/core/dev.c:5727)
[   62.876795] napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37
./include/net/gro.h:434 ./include/net/gro.h:429 net/core/dev.c:6067)
[   62.881004] ixgbe_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:3191)
[   62.893534] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6498)
[   62.897133] napi_threaded_poll (./include/linux/netpoll.h:89
net/core/dev.c:6640)
[   62.905276] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:379)
[   62.913435] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314)
[   62.917119]  </TASK>

In the critical scenario, rx-gro-list GRO-ed packets are fed, via a
bridge, both to the local input path and to an egress device (tun).

The segmentation of such packets unsafely writes to the cloned skbs
with shared heads.

This change addresses the issue by uncloning as needed the
to-be-segmented skbs.

Reported-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com>
Fixes: 3a1296a3 ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The tracepoint has existed for 12 years, but it only covered udp
over the legacy IPv4 protocol. Having it enabled for udp6 removes
the unnecessary difference in error visibility.

Signed-off-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: 296f7ea7 ("udp: add tracepoints for queueing skb to rcvbuf")
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), fw_set_parms() will
immediately return an error after incrementing or decrementing
reference counter in tcf_bind_filter().  If attacker can control
reference counter to zero and make reference freed, leading to
use after free.

In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the
point where the TC_FW_CLASSID is handled.

Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Message-ID: <20230705161530.52003-1-ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When evaluating byteorder expressions with size 2, a union with 32-bit and
16-bit members is used. Since the 16-bit members are aligned to 32-bit,
the array accesses will be out-of-bounds.

It may lead to a stack-out-of-bounds access like the one below:

[   23.095215] ==================================================================
[   23.095625] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.096020] Read of size 2 at addr ffffc90000007948 by task ping/115
[   23.096358]
[   23.096456] CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.4.0+ #413
[   23.096770] Call Trace:
[   23.096910]  <IRQ>
[   23.097030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xc0
[   23.097218]  print_report+0xcf/0x630
[   23.097388]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097577]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xc0
[   23.097760]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097949]  kasan_report+0xc9/0x110
[   23.098106]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098298]  __asan_load2+0x83/0xd0
[   23.098453]  nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098659]  nft_do_chain+0x1c8/0xc50
[   23.098852]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain+0x10/0x10
[   23.099078]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099295]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099535]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099745]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099929]  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0xfe/0x140
[   23.100105]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.100327]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.100515]  ? nf_hook.constprop.0+0x340/0x550
[   23.100779]  nf_hook_slow+0x6c/0x100
[   23.100977]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.101223]  nf_hook.constprop.0+0x334/0x550
[   23.101443]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.101677]  ? __pfx_nf_hook.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.101882]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102071]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102291]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x4b/0x70
[   23.102481]  ip_local_deliver+0xbb/0x110
[   23.102665]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.102839]  ip_rcv+0x199/0x2a0
[   23.102980]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.103140]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13e/0x150
[   23.103362]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
[   23.103647]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.103819]  ? process_backlog+0x36c/0x380
[   23.103999]  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xc0
[   23.104179]  process_backlog+0x91/0x380
[   23.104350]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x66/0x360
[   23.104589]  ? net_rx_action+0x1cb/0x610
[   23.104811]  net_rx_action+0x33e/0x610
[   23.105024]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x50
[   23.105257]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
[   23.105485]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.105741]  __do_softirq+0xfa/0x5ab
[   23.105956]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x765/0x1c00
[   23.106193]  do_softirq.part.0+0x49/0xc0
[   23.106423]  </IRQ>
[   23.106547]  <TASK>
[   23.106670]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf5/0x120
[   23.106903]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x789/0x1c00
[   23.107131]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
[   23.107381]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.107585]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.107798]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108049]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.108265]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108514]  neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.108753]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.109003]  ip_finish_output2+0x3c3/0x10b0
[   23.109250]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
[   23.109510]  ? __pfx_nf_hook+0x10/0x10
[   23.109732]  __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x390
[   23.109978]  ip_finish_output+0x2f/0x130
[   23.110207]  ip_output+0xc9/0x170
[   23.110404]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x1a0/0x240
[   23.110652]  raw_sendmsg+0x102e/0x19e0
[   23.110871]  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.111093]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.111304]  ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x148/0x330
[   23.111567]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111777]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111993]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x7c/0x2f0
[   23.112225]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x18a/0x550
[   23.112431]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x4f1/0x900
[   23.112665]  ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10
[   23.112880]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.113098]  inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113297]  ? inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113500]  ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.113727]  sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x100
[   23.113924]  ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x4f/0xa0
[   23.114190]  __sys_sendto+0x1d4/0x290
[   23.114391]  ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
[   23.114621]  ? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.114869]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.115076]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.115287]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x60
[   23.115503]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x6e2/0x860
[   23.115778]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[   23.116008]  ? blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x8d/0x770
[   23.116285]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   23.116503]  ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
[   23.116713]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x7f/0xb0
[   23.116924]  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90
[   23.117123]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x30
[   23.117387]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[   23.117593]  ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x140
[   23.117806]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[   23.118081] RIP: 0033:0x7f744aee2bba
[   23.118282] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
[   23.119237] RSP: 002b:00007ffd04a7c9f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   23.119644] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd04a7e0a0 RCX: 00007f744aee2bba
[   23.120023] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056488e9e6300 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   23.120413] RBP: 000056488e9e6300 R08: 00007ffd04a80320 R09: 0000000000000010
[   23.120809] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
[   23.121219] R13: 00007ffd04a7dc38 R14: 00007ffd04a7ca00 R15: 00007ffd04a7e0a0
[   23.121617]  </TASK>
[   23.121749]
[   23.121845] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[   23.121845]  [ffffc90000000000, ffffc90000009000) created by:
[   23.121845]  irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x1cf/0x270
[   23.122707]
[   23.122803] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   23.123104] page:0000000072ac19f0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x24a09
[   23.123609] flags: 0xfffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[   23.123998] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[   23.124194] raw: 000fffffc0001000 ffffea0000928248 ffffea0000928248 0000000000000000
[   23.124610] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   23.125023] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   23.125326]
[   23.125421] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   23.125682]  ffffc90000007800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   23.126072]  ffffc90000007880: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00
[   23.126455] >ffffc90000007900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00
[   23.126840]                                               ^
[   23.127138]  ffffc90000007980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3
[   23.127522]  ffffc90000007a00: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[   23.127906] ==================================================================
[   23.128324] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Using simple s16 pointers for the 16-bit accesses fixes the problem. For
the 32-bit accesses, src and dst can be used directly.

Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Tanguy DUBROCA (@SidewayRE) from @Synacktiv working with ZDI
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

When adding a rule to a chain referring to its ID, if that chain had been
deleted on the same batch, the rule might end up referring to a deleted
chain.

This will lead to a WARNING like following:

[   33.098431] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   33.098678] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 69 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2037 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.099217] Modules linked in:
[   33.099388] CPU: 5 PID: 69 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.4.0+ #409
[   33.099726] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
[   33.100018] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.100306] Code: 8b 7c 24 68 e8 64 9c ed fe 4c 89 e7 e8 5c 9c ed fe 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7
[   33.101271] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004ffc48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   33.101546] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888006fc0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   33.101920] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   33.102649] RBP: ffffc900004ffc78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   33.103018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880135ef500
[   33.103385] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff888006fc0a10
[   33.103762] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888024c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   33.104184] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   33.104493] CR2: 00007fe863b56a50 CR3: 00000000124b0001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   33.104872] PKRU: 55555554
[   33.104999] Call Trace:
[   33.105113]  <TASK>
[   33.105214]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[   33.105371]  ? __warn+0xa5/0x210
[   33.105520]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.105732]  ? report_bug+0x1f2/0x200
[   33.105902]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[   33.106546]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[   33.106762]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[   33.106995]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.107249]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x30/0x260
[   33.107506]  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x669/0x680
[   33.107782]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   33.107996]  ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.108294]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x70
[   33.108538]  process_one_work+0x68c/0xb70
[   33.108755]  ? lock_acquire+0x17f/0x420
[   33.108977]  ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.109218]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x128/0x1d0
[   33.109435]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x71/0x80
[   33.109634]  worker_thread+0x2bd/0x700
[   33.109817]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110254]  kthread+0x18b/0x1d0
[   33.110410]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110581]  ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[   33.110757]  </TASK>
[   33.110866] irq event stamp: 1651
[   33.111017] hardirqs last  enabled at (1659): [<ffffffffa206a209>] __up_console_sem+0x79/0xa0
[   33.111379] hardirqs last disabled at (1666): [<ffffffffa206a1ee>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0xa0
[   33.111740] softirqs last  enabled at (1616): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112094] softirqs last disabled at (1367): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112453] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is due to the nft_chain_lookup_byid ignoring the genmask. After this
change, adding the new rule will fail as it will not find the chain.

Fixes: 837830a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID attribute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mingi Cho of Theori working with ZDI
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Originally this used jhash2() over tuple and folded the zone id,
the pernet hash value, destination port and l4 protocol number into the
32bit seed value.

When the switch to siphash was done, I used an on-stack temporary
buffer to build a suitable key to be hashed via siphash().

But this showed up as performance regression, so I got rid of
the temporary copy and collected to-be-hashed data in 4 u64 variables.

This makes it easy to build tuples that produce the same hash, which isn't
desirable even though chain lengths are limited.

Switch back to plain siphash, but just like with jhash2(), take advantage
of the fact that most of to-be-hashed data is already in a suitable order.

Use an empty struct as annotation in 'struct nf_conntrack_tuple' to mark
last member that can be used as hash input.

The only remaining data that isn't present in the tuple structure are the
zone identifier and the pernet hash: fold those into the key.

Fixes: d2c806ab ("netfilter: conntrack: use siphash_4u64")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

If nf_conntrack_init_start() fails (for example due to a
register_nf_conntrack_bpf() failure), the nf_conntrack_helper_fini()
clean-up path frees the nf_ct_helper_hash map.

When built with NF_CONNTRACK=y, further netfilter modules (e.g:
netfilter_conntrack_ftp) can still be loaded and call
nf_conntrack_helpers_register(), independently of whether nf_conntrack
initialized correctly. This accesses the nf_ct_helper_hash dangling
pointer and causes a uaf, possibly leading to random memory corruption.

This patch guards nf_conntrack_helper_register() from accessing a freed
or uninitialized nf_ct_helper_hash pointer and fixes possible
uses-after-free when loading a conntrack module.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12f7a505 ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Now that conntrack core is allowd to insert clashing entries, make sure
GRE won't set assured flag on NAT_CLASH entries, just like UDP.

Doing so prevents early_drop logic for these entries.

Fixes: d671fd82 ("netfilter: conntrack: allow insertion clash of gre protocol")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Overflow use refcount checks are not complete.

Add helper function to deal with object reference counter tracking.
Report -EMFILE in case UINT_MAX is reached.

nft_use_dec() splats in case that reference counter underflows,
which should not ever happen.

Add nft_use_inc_restore() and nft_use_dec_restore() which are used
to restore reference counter from error and abort paths.

Use u32 in nft_flowtable and nft_object since helper functions cannot
work on bitfields.

Remove the few early incomplete checks now that the helper functions
are in place and used to check for refcount overflow.

Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Since the blamed commit, closing the first subflow resets the first
subflow socket state to SS_UNCONNECTED.

The current mptcp listen implementation relies only on such
state to prevent touching not-fully-disconnected sockets.

Incoming mptcp fastclose (or paired endpoint removal) unconditionally
closes the first subflow.

All the above allows an incoming fastclose followed by a listen() call
to successfully race with a blocking recvmsg(), potentially causing the
latter to hit a divide by zero bug in cleanup_rbuf/__tcp_select_window().

Address the issue explicitly checking the msk socket state in
mptcp_listen(). An alternative solution would be moving the first
subflow socket state update into mptcp_disconnect(), but in the long
term the first subflow socket should be removed: better avoid relaying
on it for internal consistency check.

Fixes: b29fcfb5 ("mptcp: full disconnect implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/414


Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

While tacking care of the mptcp-level listener I unintentionally
moved the subflow level unhash after the subflow listener backlog
cleanup.

That could cause some nasty race and makes the code harder to read.

Address the issue restoring the proper order of operations.

Fixes: 57fc0f1c ("mptcp: ensure listener is unhashed before updating the sk status")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

incl_srcpt has the limitation, mentioned in commit b4638af8 ("net:
dsa: sja1105: always enable the INCL_SRCPT option"), that frames with a
MAC DA of 01:80:c2:xx:yy:zz will be received as 01:80:c2:00:00:zz unless
PTP RX timestamping is enabled.

The incl_srcpt option was initially unconditionally enabled, then that
changed with commit 42824463 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Limit use of
incl_srcpt to bridge+vlan mode"), then again with b4638af8 ("net:
dsa: sja1105: always enable the INCL_SRCPT option"). Bottom line is that
it now needs to be always enabled, otherwise the driver does not have a
reliable source of information regarding source_port and switch_id for
link-local traffic (tag_8021q VLANs may be imprecise since now they
identify an entire bridging domain when ports are not standalone).

If we accept that PTP RX timestamping (and therefore, meta frame
generation) is always enabled in hardware, then that limitation could be
avoided and packets with any MAC DA can be properly received, because
meta frames do contain the original bytes from the MAC DA of their
associated link-local packet.

This change enables meta frame generation unconditionally, which also
has the nice side effects of simplifying the switch control path
(a switch reset is no longer required on hwtstamping settings change)
and the tagger data path (it no longer needs to be informed whether to
expect meta frames or not - it always does).

Fixes: 227d07a0 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for traffic through standalone ports")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The SJA1105 manual says that at offset 4 into the meta frame payload we
have "MAC destination byte 2" and at offset 5 we have "MAC destination
byte 1". These are counted from the LSB, so byte 1 is h_dest[ETH_HLEN-2]
aka h_dest[4] and byte 2 is h_dest[ETH_HLEN-3] aka h_dest[3].

The sja1105_meta_unpack() function decodes these the other way around,
so a frame with MAC DA 01:80:c2:11:22:33 is received by the network
stack as having 01:80:c2:22:11:33.

Fixes: e53e18a6 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Receive and decode meta frames")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The attribute TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX is not be included in pedit_policy and
one malicious user could fake a TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX whose length is
smaller than the intended sizeof(struct tc_pedit). Hence, the
dereference in tcf_pedit_init() could access dirty heap data.

static int tcf_pedit_init(...)
{
  // ...
  pattr = tb[TCA_PEDIT_PARMS]; // TCA_PEDIT_PARMS is included
  if (!pattr)
    pattr = tb[TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX]; // but this is not

  // ...
  parm = nla_data(pattr);

  index = parm->index; // parm is able to be smaller than 4 bytes
                       // and this dereference gets dirty skb_buff
                       // data created in netlink_sendmsg
}

This commit adds TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX length in pedit_policy which avoid
the above case, just like the TCA_PEDIT_PARMS.

Fixes: 71d0ed70 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703110842.590282-1-linma@zju.edu.cn


Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Initial creation of an AF_XDP socket requires CAP_NET_RAW capability. A
privileged process might create the socket and pass it to a non-privileged
process for later use. However, that process will be able to bind the socket
to any network interface. Even though it will not be able to receive any
traffic without modification of the BPF map, the situation is not ideal.

Sockets already have a mechanism that can be used to restrict what interface
they can be attached to. That is SO_BINDTODEVICE.

To change the SO_BINDTODEVICE binding the process will need CAP_NET_RAW.

Make xsk_bind() honor the SO_BINDTODEVICE in order to allow safer workflow
when non-privileged process is using AF_XDP.

The intended workflow is following:

  1. First process creates a bare socket with socket(AF_XDP, ...).
  2. First process loads the XSK program to the interface.
  3. First process adds the socket fd to a BPF map.
  4. First process ties socket fd to a particular interface using
     SO_BINDTODEVICE.
  5. First process sends socket fd to a second process.
  6. Second process allocates UMEM.
  7. Second process binds socket to the interface with bind(...).
  8. Second process sends/receives the traffic.

All the steps above are possible today if the first process is privileged
and the second one has sufficient RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and no capabilities.
However, the second process will be able to bind the socket to any interface
it wants on step 7 and send traffic from it. With the proposed change, the
second process will be able to bind the socket only to a specific interface
chosen by the first process at step 4.

Fixes: 965a9909 ("xsk: add support for bind for Rx")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230703175329.3259672-1-i.maximets@ovn.org

request sockets are lockless, __tcp_oow_rate_limited() could be called
on the same object from different cpus. This is harmless.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations to avoid a KCSAN report.

Fixes: 4ce7e93c ("tcp: rate limit ACK sent by SYN_RECV request sockets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There was a regression introduced by the blamed commit, where pinging to
a VLAN-unaware bridge would fail with the repeated message "Couldn't
decode source port" coming from the tagging protocol driver.

When receiving packets with a bridge_vid as determined by
dsa_tag_8021q_bridge_join(), dsa_8021q_rcv() will decode:
- source_port = 0 (which isn't really valid, more like "don't know")
- switch_id = 0 (which isn't really valid, more like "don't know")
- vbid = value in range 1-7

Since the blamed patch has reversed the order of the checks, we are now
going to believe that source_port != -1 and switch_id != -1, so they're
valid, but they aren't.

The minimal solution to the problem is to only populate source_port and
switch_id with what dsa_8021q_rcv() came up with, if the vbid is zero,
i.e. the source port information is trustworthy.

Fixes: c1ae02d8 ("net: dsa: tag_sja1105: always prefer source port information from INCL_SRCPT")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

According to the synchronization rules for .ndo_get_stats() as seen in
Documentation/networking/netdevices.rst, acquiring a plain spin_lock()
should not be illegal, but the bridge driver implementation makes it so.

After running these commands, I am being faced with the following
lockdep splat:

$ ip link add link swp0 name macsec0 type macsec encrypt on && ip link set swp0 up
$ ip link add dev br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 && ip link set br0 up
$ ip link set macsec0 master br0 && ip link set macsec0 up

  ========================================================
  WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
  6.4.0-04295-g31b577b4bd4a #603 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------------------
  swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock:
  ffff6bd348724cd8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x34/0x198
  but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
   (&ocelot->stats_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}

  and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

  other info that might help us debug this:
  Chain exists of:
    &br->lock --> &br->hash_lock --> &ocelot->stats_lock

   Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(&ocelot->stats_lock);
                                 local_irq_disable();
                                 lock(&br->lock);
                                 lock(&br->hash_lock);
    <Interrupt>
      lock(&br->lock);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

(details about the 3 locks skipped)

swp0 is instantiated by drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c, and this
only matters to the extent that its .ndo_get_stats64() method calls
spin_lock(&ocelot->stats_lock).

Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst says:

| A lock is irq-safe means it was ever used in an irq context, while a lock
| is irq-unsafe means it was ever acquired with irq enabled.

(...)

| Furthermore, the following usage based lock dependencies are not allowed
| between any two lock-classes::
|
|    <hardirq-safe>   ->  <hardirq-unsafe>
|    <softirq-safe>   ->  <softirq-unsafe>

Lockdep marks br->hash_lock as softirq-safe, because it is sometimes
taken in softirq context (for example br_fdb_update() which runs in
NET_RX softirq), and when it's not in softirq context it blocks softirqs
by using spin_lock_bh().

Lockdep marks ocelot->stats_lock as softirq-unsafe, because it never
blocks softirqs from running, and it is never taken from softirq
context. So it can always be interrupted by softirqs.

There is a call path through which a function that holds br->hash_lock:
fdb_add_hw_addr() will call a function that acquires ocelot->stats_lock:
ocelot_port_get_stats64(). This can be seen below:

ocelot_port_get_stats64+0x3c/0x1e0
felix_get_stats64+0x20/0x38
dsa_slave_get_stats64+0x3c/0x60
dev_get_stats+0x74/0x2c8
rtnl_fill_stats+0x4c/0x150
rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x5cc/0x7b8
rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0xe4/0x150
rtmsg_ifinfo+0x5c/0xb0
__dev_notify_flags+0x58/0x200
__dev_set_promiscuity+0xa0/0x1f8
dev_set_promiscuity+0x30/0x70
macsec_dev_change_rx_flags+0x68/0x88
__dev_set_promiscuity+0x1a8/0x1f8
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x74/0xa8
dev_uc_add+0x74/0xa0
fdb_add_hw_addr+0x68/0xd8
fdb_add_local+0xc4/0x110
br_fdb_add_local+0x54/0x88
br_add_if+0x338/0x4a0
br_add_slave+0x20/0x38
do_setlink+0x3a4/0xcb8
rtnl_newlink+0x758/0x9d0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2f0/0x550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x128/0x148
rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x38

the plain English explanation for it is:

The macsec0 bridge port is created without p->flags & BR_PROMISC,
because it is what br_manage_promisc() decides for a VLAN filtering
bridge with a single auto port.

As part of the br_add_if() procedure, br_fdb_add_local() is called for
the MAC address of the device, and this results in a call to
dev_uc_add() for macsec0 while the softirq-safe br->hash_lock is taken.

Because macsec0 does not have IFF_UNICAST_FLT, dev_uc_add() ends up
calling __dev_set_promiscuity() for macsec0, which is propagated by its
implementation, macsec_dev_change_rx_flags(), to the lower device: swp0.
This triggers the call path:

dev_set_promiscuity(swp0)
-> rtmsg_ifinfo()
   -> dev_get_stats()
      -> ocelot_port_get_stats64()

with a calling context that lockdep doesn't like (br->hash_lock held).

Normally we don't see this, because even though many drivers that can be
bridge ports don't support IFF_UNICAST_FLT, we need a driver that

(a) doesn't support IFF_UNICAST_FLT, *and*
(b) it forwards the IFF_PROMISC flag to another driver, and
(c) *that* driver implements ndo_get_stats64() using a softirq-unsafe
    spinlock.

Condition (b) is necessary because the first __dev_set_rx_mode() calls
__dev_set_promiscuity() with "bool notify=false", and thus, the
rtmsg_ifinfo() code path won't be entered.

The same criteria also hold true for DSA switches which don't report
IFF_UNICAST_FLT. When the DSA master uses a spin_lock() in its
ndo_get_stats64() method, the same lockdep splat can be seen.

I think the deadlock possibility is real, even though I didn't reproduce
it, and I'm thinking of the following situation to support that claim:

fdb_add_hw_addr() runs on a CPU A, in a context with softirqs locally
disabled and br->hash_lock held, and may end up attempting to acquire
ocelot->stats_lock.

In parallel, ocelot->stats_lock is currently held by a thread B (say,
ocelot_check_stats_work()), which is interrupted while holding it by a
softirq which attempts to lock br->hash_lock.

Thread B cannot make progress because br->hash_lock is held by A. Whereas
thread A cannot make progress because ocelot->stats_lock is held by B.

When taking the issue at face value, the bridge can avoid that problem
by simply making the ports promiscuous from a code path with a saner
calling context (br->hash_lock not held). A bridge port without
IFF_UNICAST_FLT is going to become promiscuous as soon as we call
dev_uc_add() on it (which we do unconditionally), so why not be
preemptive and make it promiscuous right from the beginning, so as to
not be taken by surprise.

With this, we've broken the links between code that holds br->hash_lock
or br->lock and code that calls into the ndo_change_rx_flags() or
ndo_get_stats64() ops of the bridge port.

Fixes: 2796d0c6 ("bridge: Automatically manage port promiscuous mode.")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The ISO Interval on CIS Established Event uses 1.25 ms slots:

    BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.3 | Vol 4, Part E
    page 2304:

      Time = N * 1.25 ms

In addition to that this always update the QoS settings based on CIS
Established Event.

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation.

./net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1880:7-14: WARNING opportunity for kmemdup.

Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5597


Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Now that the driver core allows for struct class to be in read-only
memory, move the bt_class structure to be declared at build time
placing it into read-only memory, instead of having to be dynamically
allocated at load time.

Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

This rework sync_interval to be sync_factor as having sync_interval in
the order of seconds is sometimes not disarable.

Wit sync_factor the application can tell how many SDU intervals it wants
to send an announcement with PA, the EA interval is set to 2 times that
so a factor of 24 of BIG SDU interval of 10ms would look like the
following:

< HCI Command: LE Set Extended Advertising Parameters (0x08|0x0036) plen 25
        Handle: 0x01
        Properties: 0x0000
        Min advertising interval: 480.000 msec (0x0300)
        Max advertising interval: 480.000 msec (0x0300)
        Channel map: 37, 38, 39 (0x07)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Peer address type: Public (0x00)
        Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00)
        Filter policy: Allow Scan Request from Any, Allow Connect Request from Any (0x00)
        TX power: Host has no preference (0x7f)
        Primary PHY: LE 1M (0x01)
        Secondary max skip: 0x00
        Secondary PHY: LE 2M (0x02)
        SID: 0x00
        Scan request notifications: Disabled (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Periodic Advertising Parameters (0x08|0x003e) plen 7
        Handle: 1
        Min interval: 240.00 msec (0x00c0)
        Max interval: 240.00 msec (0x00c0)
        Properties: 0x0000

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When receiving a scan response there is no way to know if the remote
device is connectable or not, so when it cannot be merged don't
make any assumption and instead just mark it with a new flag defined as
MGMT_DEV_FOUND_SCAN_RSP so userspace can tell it is a standalone
SCAN_RSP.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/CABBYNZ+CYMsDSPTxBn09Js3BcdC-x7vZFfyLJ3ppZGGwJKmUTw@mail.gmail.com/


Fixes: c70a7e4c ("Bluetooth: Add support for Not Connectable flag for Device Found events")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

If the event has error status, return right error code and don't show
incorrect "response malformed" messages.

Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When reconfiguring CIG after disconnection of the last CIS, LE Remove
CIG shall be sent before LE Set CIG Parameters.  Otherwise, it fails
because CIG is in the inactive state and not configurable (Core v5.3
Vol 6 Part B Sec. 4.5.14.3). This ordering is currently wrong under
suitable timing conditions, because LE Remove CIG is sent via the
hci_sync queue and may be delayed, but Set CIG Parameters is via
hci_send_cmd.

Make the ordering well-defined by sending also Set CIG Parameters via
hci_sync.

Fixes: 26afbd82 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive
and point to the already free'd sk's address.
To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276

CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
 print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650
 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386
 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480
 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline]
 l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline]
 l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788
 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506
 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline]
 hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048
 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376
 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 288:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040
 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093
 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852
 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898
 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132
 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518
 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Freed by task 288:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline]
 __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168
 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183
 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194
 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205
 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
 l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257
 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428
 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650
 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368
 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320
 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of
 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614
head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10
raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                  ^
 ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other
contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng.
Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Devices that lack persistent storage for the device address can indicate
this by setting the HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR which causes the controller
to be marked as unconfigured until user space has set a valid address.

The related HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY was later added to similarly
indicate that the device lacks a valid address but that one may be
specified in the devicetree.

As is clear from commit 7a0e5b15 ("Bluetooth: Add quirk for reading
BD_ADDR from fwnode property") that added and documented this quirk and
commits like de79a9df ("Bluetooth: btqcomsmd: use
HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY"), the device address of controllers with
this flag should be treated as invalid until user space has had a chance
to configure the controller in case the devicetree property is missing.

As it does not make sense to allow controllers with invalid addresses,
restore the original semantics, which also makes sure that the
implementation is consistent (e.g. get_missing_options() indicates that
the address must be set) and matches the documentation (including
comments in the code, such as, "In case any of them is set, the
controller has to start up as unconfigured.").

Fixes: e668eb1e ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Don't stop BT if the BD address missing in dts")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Devices that lack persistent storage for the device address can indicate
this by setting the HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR which causes the controller
to be marked as unconfigured until user space has set a valid address.

Once configured, the device address must be set on every setup for
controllers with HCI_QUIRK_NON_PERSISTENT_SETUP to avoid marking the
controller as unconfigured and requiring the address to be set again.

Fixes: 740011cf ("Bluetooth: Add new quirk for non-persistent setup settings")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Fix potential use-after-free in l2cap_le_command_rej.

Signed-off-by: Zhengping Jiang <jiangzp@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Currently the sja1105 tagging protocol prefers using the source port
information from the VLAN header if that is available, falling back to
the INCL_SRCPT option if it isn't. The VLAN header is available for all
frames except for META frames initiated by the switch (containing RX
timestamps), and thus, the "if (is_link_local)" branch is practically
dead.

The tag_8021q source port identification has become more loose
("imprecise") and will report a plausible rather than exact bridge port,
when under a bridge (be it VLAN-aware or VLAN-unaware). But link-local
traffic always needs to know the precise source port. With incorrect
source port reporting, for example PTP traffic over 2 bridged ports will
all be seen on sockets opened on the first such port, which is incorrect.

Now that the tagging protocol has been changed to make link-local frames
always contain source port information, we can reverse the order of the
checks so that we always give precedence to that information (which is
always precise) in lieu of the tag_8021q VID which is only precise for a
standalone port.

Fixes: d7f9787a ("net: dsa: tag_8021q: add support for imprecise RX based on the VBID")
Fixes: 91495f21 ("net: dsa: tag_8021q: replace the SVL bridging with VLAN-unaware IVL bridging")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>