Klara Modin reported warnings for a kernel configured with BPF_JIT but
without MODULES:

[   44.131296] Trying to vfree() bad address (000000004a17c299)
[   44.138024] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 193 at mm/vmalloc.c:3189 remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[   44.146675] CPU: 1 PID: 193 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G      D W          6.9.0-01786-g2c9e5d4a0082 #25
[   44.158229] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B (DT)
[   44.164433] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
[   44.170492] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   44.178601] pc : remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[   44.183705] lr : remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[   44.188772] sp : ffff800082a13c70
[   44.193112] x29: ffff800082a13c70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[   44.201384] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff00003a44efa0 x24: 00000000d4202000
[   44.209658] x23: ffff800081223dd0 x22: ffff00003a198a40 x21: ffff8000814dd880
[   44.217924] x20: 00000000d4202000 x19: ffff8000814dd880 x18: 0000000000000006
[   44.226206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: 0000000000000002
[   44.234460] x14: ffff8000811a6370 x13: 0000000020000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[   44.242710] x11: ffff8000811a6370 x10: 0000000000000144 x9 : ffff8000811fe370
[   44.250959] x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : 00000000fffff000 x6 : ffff8000811fe370
[   44.259206] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   44.267457] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000002203240
[   44.275703] Call trace:
[   44.279158] remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[   44.283858] vfree (mm/vmalloc.c:3322)
[   44.287835] execmem_free (mm/execmem.c:70)
[   44.292347] bpf_jit_free_exec+0x10/0x1c
[   44.297283] bpf_prog_pack_free (kernel/bpf/core.c:1006)
[   44.302457] bpf_jit_binary_pack_free (kernel/bpf/core.c:1195)
[   44.307951] bpf_jit_free (include/linux/filter.h:1083 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:2474)
[   44.312342] bpf_prog_free_deferred (kernel/bpf/core.c:2785)
[   44.317785] process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3273)
[   44.322684] worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3342 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3429 (discriminator 2))
[   44.327292] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388)
[   44.331342] ret_from_fork (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:861)

The problem is because bpf_arch_text_copy() silently fails to write to the
read-only area as a result of patch_map() faulting and the resulting
-EFAULT being chucked away.

Update patch_map() to use CONFIG_EXECMEM instead of
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to check for vmalloc addresses.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521213813.703309-1-rppt@kernel.org


Fixes: 2c9e5d4a ("bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7983fbbf-0127-457c-9394-8d6e4299c685@gmail.com


Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.

This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.

In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.

Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits.  Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1].  The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it.  The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. 
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct).  mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.

Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system.  For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped.  Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime.  A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4].  Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.

Two system calls are involved in sealing the map:  mmap() and mseal().

The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:

int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.

mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.

1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
   via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
   be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.

2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
   via mremap().

3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).

4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
   risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
   unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.

5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().

6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
   memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
   behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
   memset(0) for anonymous memory.

The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5].  Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.

Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications.  For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.

Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators.  The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions).  The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. 
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).

However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk.  For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow.  Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid.  In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.

Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. 
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables.  To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup.  Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.

In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:

Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
  destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
  implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.

MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.

To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]

The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.

The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
    create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
    start the sampling
    for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
        mprotect one mapping
    stop and save the sample
    delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.

Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.

Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__	vmas	t	t_mseal	delta_ns	per_vma	%
munmap__  	1	909	944	35	35	104%
munmap__  	2	1398	1502	104	52	107%
munmap__  	4	2444	2594	149	37	106%
munmap__  	8	4029	4323	293	37	107%
munmap__  	16	6647	6935	288	18	104%
munmap__  	32	11811	12398	587	18	105%
mprotect	1	439	465	26	26	106%
mprotect	2	1659	1745	86	43	105%
mprotect	4	3747	3889	142	36	104%
mprotect	8	6755	6969	215	27	103%
mprotect	16	13748	14144	396	25	103%
mprotect	32	27827	28969	1142	36	104%
madvise_	1	240	262	22	22	109%
madvise_	2	366	442	76	38	121%
madvise_	4	623	751	128	32	121%
madvise_	8	1110	1324	215	27	119%
madvise_	16	2127	2451	324	20	115%
madvise_	32	4109	4642	534	17	113%

The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__	vmas	cpu	cmseal	delta_cpu	per_vma	%
munmap__	1	1790	1890	100	100	106%
munmap__	2	2819	3033	214	107	108%
munmap__	4	4959	5271	312	78	106%
munmap__	8	8262	8745	483	60	106%
munmap__	16	13099	14116	1017	64	108%
munmap__	32	23221	24785	1565	49	107%
mprotect	1	906	967	62	62	107%
mprotect	2	3019	3203	184	92	106%
mprotect	4	6149	6569	420	105	107%
mprotect	8	9978	10524	545	68	105%
mprotect	16	20448	21427	979	61	105%
mprotect	32	40972	42935	1963	61	105%
madvise_	1	434	497	63	63	115%
madvise_	2	752	899	147	74	120%
madvise_	4	1313	1513	200	50	115%
madvise_	8	2271	2627	356	44	116%
madvise_	16	4312	4883	571	36	113%
madvise_	32	8376	9319	943	29	111%

Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.

In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__	vmas	t	tmseal	delta_ns	per_vma	%
munmap__	1	357	390	33	33	109%
munmap__	2	442	463	21	11	105%
munmap__	4	614	634	20	5	103%
munmap__	8	1017	1137	120	15	112%
munmap__	16	1889	2153	263	16	114%
munmap__	32	4109	4088	-21	-1	99%
mprotect	1	235	227	-7	-7	97%
mprotect	2	495	464	-30	-15	94%
mprotect	4	741	764	24	6	103%
mprotect	8	1434	1437	2	0	100%
mprotect	16	2958	2991	33	2	101%
mprotect	32	6431	6608	177	6	103%
madvise_	1	191	208	16	16	109%
madvise_	2	300	324	24	12	108%
madvise_	4	450	473	23	6	105%
madvise_	8	753	806	53	7	107%
madvise_	16	1467	1592	125	8	108%
madvise_	32	2795	3405	610	19	122%
					
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__	nbr_vma	cpu	cmseal	delta_cpu	per_vma	%
munmap__	1	684	715	31	31	105%
munmap__	2	861	898	38	19	104%
munmap__	4	1183	1235	51	13	104%
munmap__	8	1999	2045	46	6	102%
munmap__	16	3839	3816	-23	-1	99%
munmap__	32	7672	7887	216	7	103%
mprotect	1	397	443	46	46	112%
mprotect	2	738	788	50	25	107%
mprotect	4	1221	1256	35	9	103%
mprotect	8	2356	2429	72	9	103%
mprotect	16	4961	4935	-26	-2	99%
mprotect	32	9882	10172	291	9	103%
madvise_	1	351	380	29	29	108%
madvise_	2	565	615	49	25	109%
madvise_	4	872	933	61	15	107%
madvise_	8	1508	1640	132	16	109%
madvise_	16	3078	3323	245	15	108%
madvise_	32	5893	6704	811	25	114%

For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.

It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__	vmas	t_5_10	t_6_8	delta_ns	per_vma	%
munmap__	1	357	909	552	552	254%
munmap__	2	442	1398	956	478	316%
munmap__	4	614	2444	1830	458	398%
munmap__	8	1017	4029	3012	377	396%
munmap__	16	1889	6647	4758	297	352%
munmap__	32	4109	11811	7702	241	287%
mprotect	1	235	439	204	204	187%
mprotect	2	495	1659	1164	582	335%
mprotect	4	741	3747	3006	752	506%
mprotect	8	1434	6755	5320	665	471%
mprotect	16	2958	13748	10790	674	465%
mprotect	32	6431	27827	21397	669	433%
madvise_	1	191	240	49	49	125%
madvise_	2	300	366	67	33	122%
madvise_	4	450	623	173	43	138%
madvise_	8	753	1110	357	45	147%
madvise_	16	1467	2127	660	41	145%
madvise_	32	2795	4109	1314	41	147%

The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__	vmas	cpu_5_10	c_6_8	delta_cpu	per_vma	%
munmap__	1	684	1790	1106	1106	262%
munmap__	2	861	2819	1958	979	327%
munmap__	4	1183	4959	3776	944	419%
munmap__	8	1999	8262	6263	783	413%
munmap__	16	3839	13099	9260	579	341%
munmap__	32	7672	23221	15549	486	303%
mprotect	1	397	906	509	509	228%
mprotect	2	738	3019	2281	1140	409%
mprotect	4	1221	6149	4929	1232	504%
mprotect	8	2356	9978	7622	953	423%
mprotect	16	4961	20448	15487	968	412%
mprotect	32	9882	40972	31091	972	415%
madvise_	1	351	434	82	82	123%
madvise_	2	565	752	186	93	133%
madvise_	4	872	1313	442	110	151%
madvise_	8	1508	2271	763	95	151%
madvise_	16	3078	4312	1234	77	140%
madvise_	32	5893	8376	2483	78	142%

From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.

In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.

When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service.  Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different.  It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.


This patch (of 5):

Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org


Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

The absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of
interrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is
deferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the
original CPU.

When the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is
enforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU,
but the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately
reclaimed. Instead, apicd->move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming
process is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.

Upon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU,
irq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU's vector_cleanup list if it
remains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its
vector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.

However, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the
interrupt triggers again on the new CPU.

In that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU
to reclaim the old apicd->prev_vector because the interrupt isn't currently
affine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even
though __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it
doesn't reclaim apicd->prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both
apicd->move_in_progress and apicd->prev_vector to 0.

As a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a
CPU vector leak.

To address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move()
before the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd->prev_vector, if the
interrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.

Additionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well,
following a warning message, although theoretically it should never see
apicd->move_in_progress with apicd->prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.

Fixes: f0383c24 ("genirq/cpuhotplug: Add support for cleaning up move in progress")
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522220218.162423-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com

Commit c97bf629 ("riscv: Fix text patching when IPI are used")
converted ftrace_make_nop() to use patch_insn_write() which does not
emit any icache flush relying entirely on __ftrace_modify_code() to do
that.

But we missed that ftrace_make_nop() was called very early directly when
converting mcount calls into nops (actually on riscv it converts 2B nops
emitted by the compiler into 4B nops).

This caused crashes on multiple HW as reported by Conor and Björn since
the booting core could have half-patched instructions in its icache
which would trigger an illegal instruction trap: fix this by emitting a
local flush icache when early patching nops.

Fixes: c97bf629 ("riscv: Fix text patching when IPI are used")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reported-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Tested-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523115134.70380-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

With the rework of how the __string() handles dynamic strings where it
saves off the source string in field in the helper structure[1], the
assignment of that value to the trace event field is stored in the helper
value and does not need to be passed in again.

This means that with:

  __string(field, mystring)

Which use to be assigned with __assign_str(field, mystring), no longer
needs the second parameter and it is unused. With this, __assign_str()
will now only get a single parameter.

There's over 700 users of __assign_str() and because coccinelle does not
handle the TRACE_EVENT() macro I ended up using the following sed script:

  git grep -l __assign_str | while read a ; do
      sed -e 's/\(__assign_str([^,]*[^ ,]\) *,[^;]*/\1)/' $a > /tmp/test-file;
      mv /tmp/test-file $a;
  done

I then searched for __assign_str() that did not end with ';' as those
were multi line assignments that the sed script above would fail to catch.

Note, the same updates will need to be done for:

  __assign_str_len()
  __assign_rel_str()
  __assign_rel_str_len()

I tested this with both an allmodconfig and an allyesconfig (build only for both).

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240222211442.634192653@goodmis.org/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240516133454.681ba6a0@rorschach.local.home



Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> for the amdgpu parts.
Acked-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> #for
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> # for thermal
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>	# xfs
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

The access_error() of vma already checked under per-VMA lock, if it
is a bad access, directly handle error, no need to retry with mmap_lock
again. Since the page faut is handled under per-VMA lock, count it as
a vma lock event with VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS.

Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403083805.1818160-6-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

The bytes copy for unaligned head would cover at most SZREG-1 bytes, so
it's better to set the threshold as >= (SZREG-1 + word_copy stride size)
which equals to 9*SZREG-1.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313091929.4029960-1-xiao.w.wang@intel.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

When the dst buffer pointer points to the last accessible aligned addr, we
could still run another iteration of unrolled copy.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313103334.4036554-1-xiao.w.wang@intel.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

Signed-off-by: Xingyou Chen <rockrush@rockwork.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240317055556.9449-1-rockrush@rockwork.org


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

The declaration of set_cpu_online() takes a bool value. So replace
int here to make it consistent with the declaration.

Signed-off-by: Zhao Ke <ke.zhao@shingroup.cn>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240318065404.123668-1-ke.zhao@shingroup.cn


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

If the load access fault occures in a leaf function (with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y), when wrong stack trace will be displayed:

[<ffffffff804853c2>] regmap_mmio_read32le+0xe/0x1c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Registers dump:
    ra     0xffffffff80485758 <regmap_mmio_read+36>
    sp     0xffffffc80200b9a0
    fp     0xffffffc80200b9b0
    pc     0xffffffff804853ba <regmap_mmio_read32le+6>

Stack dump:
    0xffffffc80200b9a0:  0xffffffc80200b9e0  0xffffffc80200b9e0
    0xffffffc80200b9b0:  0xffffffff8116d7e8  0x0000000000000100
    0xffffffc80200b9c0:  0xffffffd8055b9400  0xffffffd8055b9400
    0xffffffc80200b9d0:  0xffffffc80200b9f0  0xffffffff8047c526
    0xffffffc80200b9e0:  0xffffffc80200ba30  0xffffffff8047fe9a

The assembler dump of the function preambula:
    add     sp,sp,-16
    sd      s0,8(sp)
    add     s0,sp,16

In the fist stack frame, where ra is not stored on the stack we can
observe:

        0(sp)                  8(sp)
        .---------------------------------------------.
    sp->|       frame->fp      | frame->ra (saved fp) |
        |---------------------------------------------|
    fp->|         ....         |         ....         |
        |---------------------------------------------|
        |                      |                      |

and in the code check is performed:
	if (regs && (regs->epc == pc) && (frame->fp & 0x7))

I see no reason to check frame->fp value at all, because it is can be
uninitialized value on the stack. A better way is to check frame->ra to
be an address on the stack. After the stacktrace shows as expect:

[<ffffffff804853c2>] regmap_mmio_read32le+0xe/0x1c
[<ffffffff80485758>] regmap_mmio_read+0x24/0x52
[<ffffffff8047c526>] _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x1a/0x22
[<ffffffff8047fe9a>] _regmap_read+0x5c/0xea
[<ffffffff80480376>] _regmap_update_bits+0x76/0xc0
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
As pointed by Samuel Holland it is incorrect to remove check of the stackframe
entirely.

Changes since v2 [2]:
 - Add accidentally forgotten curly brace

Changes since v1 [1]:
 - Instead of just dropping frame->fp check, replace it with validation of
   frame->ra, which should be a stack address.
 - Move frame pointer validation into the separate function.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20240426072701.6463-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20240521131314.48895-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com/



Fixes: f766f77a ("riscv/stacktrace: Fix stack output without ra on the stack top")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bystrin <dev.mbstr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240521191727.62012-1-dev.mbstr@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

This commit replaces riscv's support for FTRACE_WITH_REGS with support
for FTRACE_WITH_ARGS. This is required for the ongoing effort to stop
relying on stop_machine() for RISCV's implementation of ftrace.

The main relevant benefit that this change will bring for the above
use-case is that now we don't have separate ftrace_caller and
ftrace_regs_caller trampolines. This will allow the callsite to call
ftrace_caller by modifying a single instruction. Now the callsite can
do something similar to:

When not tracing:            |             When tracing:

func:                                      func:
  auipc t0, ftrace_caller_top                auipc t0, ftrace_caller_top
  nop  <=========<Enable/Disable>=========>  jalr  t0, ftrace_caller_bottom
  [...]                                      [...]

The above assumes that we are dropping the support of calling a direct
trampoline from the callsite. We need to drop this as the callsite can't
change the target address to call, it can only enable/disable a call to
a preset target (ftrace_caller in the above diagram). We can later optimize
this by calling an intermediate dispatcher trampoline before ftrace_caller.

Currently, ftrace_regs_caller saves all CPU registers in the format of
struct pt_regs and allows the tracer to modify them. We don't need to
save all of the CPU registers because at function entry only a subset of
pt_regs is live:

|----------+----------+---------------------------------------------|
| Register | ABI Name | Description                                 |
|----------+----------+---------------------------------------------|
| x1       | ra       | Return address for traced function          |
| x2       | sp       | Stack pointer                               |
| x5       | t0       | Return address for ftrace_caller trampoline |
| x8       | s0/fp    | Frame pointer                               |
| x10-11   | a0-1     | Function arguments/return values            |
| x12-17   | a2-7     | Function arguments                          |
|----------+----------+---------------------------------------------|

See RISCV calling convention[1] for the above table.

Saving just the live registers decreases the amount of stack space
required from 288 Bytes to 112 Bytes.

Basic testing was done with this on the VisionFive 2 development board.

Note:
  - Moving from REGS to ARGS will mean that RISCV will stop supporting
    KPROBES_ON_FTRACE as it requires full pt_regs to be saved.
  - KPROBES_ON_FTRACE will be supplanted by FPROBES see [2].

[1] https://riscv.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/riscv-calling.pdf
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/170887410337.564249.6360118840946697039.stgit@devnote2/



Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405142453.4187-1-puranjay@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

Since commit aad15bc8 ("riscv: Change code model of module to
medany to improve data accessing"), kernel modules have not been built
with -fPIC, so they wouldn't have R_RISCV_GOT_HI20 or R_RISCV_CALL_PLT
relocations, and handling of those relocations is unnecessary.

If RELOCATABLE=y, kernel modules will be built with -fPIE, which would
reintroduce said relocations, so only select MODULE_SECTIONS when
RELOCATABLE.

Signed-off-by: Qingfang Deng <qingfang.deng@siflower.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240511015725.1162-1-dqfext@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

Define the archhelp variable so that 'make ACRH=riscv help' will show
the targets specific to building a RISC-V kernel like other
architectures.

Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240504193446.196886-3-emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

Previously the build process would always set KBUILD_IMAGE to the
uncompressed Image file (unless XIP_KERNEL or EFI_ZBOOT was enabled) and
unconditionally compress it into Image.gz. However there are already
build targets for Image.bz2, Image.lz4, Image.lzma, Image.lzo and
Image.zstd, so let's make use of those, make the compression method
configurable and set KBUILD_IMAGE accordingly so that targets like
'make install' and 'make bindeb-pkg' will use the chosen image.

Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <n.schier@avm.de>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240504193446.196886-2-emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

This uses the new ASM_INPUT_RM macro to avoid the bad code generation
issue that clang has with more generic asm inputs.

This ends up avoiding generating code like this:

 	mov    %r10,(%rsp)
 	tzcnt  (%rsp),%rcx

which now becomes just

 	tzcnt  %r10,%rcx

and in the process ends up also removing a few unnecessary stack frames
when the only use was that pointless "asm uses memory location off stack".

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Don't force the inputs to be 'unsigned long', when the comparison can
easily be done in 32-bit if that's more appropriate.

Note that while we can look at the inputs to choose an appropriate size
for the compare instruction, the output is fixed at 'unsigned long'.
That's not technically optimal either, since a 32-bit 'sbbl' would often
be sufficient.

But for the outgoing mask we don't know how the mask ends up being used
(ie we have uses that have an incoming 32-bit array index, but end up
using the mask for other things).  That said, it only costs the extra
REX prefix to always generate the 64-bit mask.

[ A 'sbbl' also always technically generates a 64-bit mask, but with the
  upper 32 bits clear: that's fine for when the incoming index that will
  be masked is already 32-bit, but not if you use the mask to mask a
  pointer afterwards, like the file table lookup does ]

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This loop is supposed to check if ext->subset_ext_ids[j] is valid, rather
than if ext->subset_ext_ids[i] is valid, before setting the extension
id ext->subset_ext_ids[j] in isainfo->isa.

Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Fixes: 0d8295ed ("riscv: add ISA extension parsing for scalar crypto")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502-cpufeature_fixes-v4-2-b3d1a088722d@rivosinc.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

The riscv_cpuinfo struct that contains mvendorid and marchid is not
populated until all harts are booted which happens after the DT parsing.
Use the mvendorid/marchid from the boot hart to determine if the DT
contains an invalid V.

Fixes: d82f3220 ("RISC-V: Ignore V from the riscv,isa DT property on older T-Head CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502-cpufeature_fixes-v4-1-b3d1a088722d@rivosinc.com


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

__kernel_map_pages() is a debug function which clears the valid bit in page
table entry for deallocated pages to detect illegal memory accesses to
freed pages.

This function set/clear the valid bit using __set_memory(). __set_memory()
acquires init_mm's semaphore, and this operation may sleep. This is
problematic, because  __kernel_map_pages() can be called in atomic context,
and thus is illegal to sleep. An example warning that this causes:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1578
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 2, name: kthreadd
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 0 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 6.9.0-g1d4c6d784ef6 #37
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff800060dc>] dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24
[<ffffffff8091ef6e>] show_stack+0x2c/0x38
[<ffffffff8092baf8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x72
[<ffffffff8092bb24>] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
[<ffffffff8003b7ac>] __might_resched+0x104/0x10e
[<ffffffff8003b7f4>] __might_sleep+0x3e/0x62
[<ffffffff8093276a>] down_write+0x20/0x72
[<ffffffff8000cf00>] __set_memory+0x82/0x2fa
[<ffffffff8000d324>] __kernel_map_pages+0x5a/0xd4
[<ffffffff80196cca>] __alloc_pages_bulk+0x3b2/0x43a
[<ffffffff8018ee82>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x196/0x6ba
[<ffffffff80011904>] copy_process+0x72c/0x17ec
[<ffffffff80012ab4>] kernel_clone+0x60/0x2fe
[<ffffffff80012f62>] kernel_thread+0x82/0xa0
[<ffffffff8003552c>] kthreadd+0x14a/0x1be
[<ffffffff809357de>] ret_from_fork+0xe/0x1c

Rewrite this function with apply_to_existing_page_range(). It is fine to
not have any locking, because __kernel_map_pages() works with pages being
allocated/deallocated and those pages are not changed by anyone else in the
meantime.

Fixes: 5fde3db5 ("riscv: add ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1289ecba9606a19917bc12b6c27da8aa23e1e5ae.1715750938.git.namcao@linutronix.de


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

debug_pagealloc is a debug feature which clears the valid bit in page table
entry for freed pages to detect illegal accesses to freed memory.

For this feature to work, virtual mapping must have PAGE_SIZE resolution.
(No, we cannot map with huge pages and split them only when needed; because
pages can be allocated/freed in atomic context and page splitting cannot be
done in atomic context)

Force linear mapping to use small pages if debug_pagealloc is enabled.

Note that it is not necessary to force the entire linear mapping, but only
those that are given to memory allocator. Some parts of memory can keep
using huge page mapping (for example, kernel's executable code). But these
parts are minority, so keep it simple. This is just a debug feature, some
extra overhead should be acceptable.

Fixes: 5fde3db5 ("riscv: add ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e391fa6c6f9b3fcf1b41cefbace02ee4ab4bf59.1715750938.git.namcao@linutronix.de


Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

virtio core already sets the .owner, so driver does not need to.

Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20240331-module-owner-virtio-v2-5-98f04bfaf46a@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is a 'convenience' flag that should reflect whether
the current CPU holds the most recent user mode FP/SIMD state of the
current task. It combines two conditions:
- whether the current CPU's FP/SIMD state belongs to the task;
- whether that state is the most recent associated with the task (as a
  task may have executed on other CPUs as well).

When a task is scheduled in and TIF_KERNEL_FPSTATE is set, it means the
task was in a kernel mode NEON section when it was scheduled out, and so
the kernel mode FP/SIMD state is restored. Since this implies that the
current CPU is *not* holding the most recent user mode FP/SIMD state of
the current task, the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag is set too, so that the
user mode FP/SIMD state is reloaded from memory when returning to
userland.

However, the task may be scheduled out after completing the kernel mode
NEON section, but before returning to userland. When this happens, the
TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE flag will not be preserved, but will be set as usual
the next time the task is scheduled in, and will be based on the above
conditions.

This means that, rather than setting TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE when scheduling
in a task with TIF_KERNEL_FPSTATE set, the underlying state should be
updated so that TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE will assume the expected value as a
result.

So instead, call fpsimd_flush_cpu_state(), which takes care of this.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cb8822182231850108fa43e0446a4c7f@kernel.org


Reported-by: Johannes Nixdorf <mixi@shadowice.org>
Fixes: aefbab8e ("arm64: fpsimd: Preserve/restore kernel mode NEON at context switch")
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Janne Grunau <j@jannau.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Janne Grunau <j@jannau.net>
Tested-by: Johannes Nixdorf <mixi@shadowice.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522091335.335346-2-ardb+git@google.com


Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

This reverts commit b8995a18.

Ard managed to reproduce the dm-crypt corruption problem and got to the
bottom of it, so re-apply the problematic patch in preparation for
fixing things properly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Code in v6.9 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c was changed by commit

  4db64279 ("x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines") from:

  static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
          X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(HASWELL_X, 0),       /* COD */
          X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_X, 0),     /* COD */
          X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY, 1),             /* SNC */	<--- 443
          {}
  };

  static bool match_llc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o)
  {
          const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(intel_cod_cpu);

to:

  static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
           X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_HASWELL_X,   0),    /* COD */
           X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, 0),    /* COD */
           X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ANY,         1),    /* SNC */
           {}
   };

  static bool match_llc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o)
  {
          const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(intel_cod_cpu);

On an Intel CPU with SNC enabled this code previously matched the rule on line
443 to avoid printing messages about insane cache configuration.  The new code
did not match any rules.

Expanding the macros for the intel_cod_cpu[] array shows that the old is
equivalent to:

  static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
  [0] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x3F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
  [1] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x4F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
  [2] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 1 },
  [3] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 }
  }

while the new code expands to:

  static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
  [0] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x3F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
  [1] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x4F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
  [2] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 1 },
  [3] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 }
  }

Looking at the code for x86_match_cpu():

  const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
  {
           const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
           struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;

           for (m = match;
                m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
                m++) {
       		...
           }
           return NULL;

it is clear that there was no match because the ANY entry in the table (array
index 2) is now the loop termination condition (all of vendor, family, model,
steppings, and feature are zero).

So this code was working before because the "ANY" check was looking for any
Intel CPU in family 6. But fails now because the family is a wild card. So the
root cause is that x86_match_cpu() has never been able to match on a rule with
just X86_VENDOR_INTEL and all other fields set to wildcards.

Add a new flags field to struct x86_cpu_id that has a bit set to indicate that
this entry in the array is valid. Update X86_MATCH*() macros to set that bit.
Change the end-marker check in x86_match_cpu() to just check the flags field
for this bit.

Backporter notes: The commit in Fixes is really the one that is broken:
you can't have m->vendor as part of the loop termination conditional in
x86_match_cpu() because it can happen - as it has happened above
- that that whole conditional is 0 albeit vendor == 0 is a valid case
- X86_VENDOR_INTEL is 0.

However, the only case where the above happens is the SNC check added by
4db64279 so you only need this fix if you have backported that
other commit

  4db64279 ("x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines")

Fixes: 644e9cbb ("Add driver auto probing for x86 features v4")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # see above
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240517144312.GBZkdtAOuJZCvxhFbJ@fat_crate.local

New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240520224620.9480-2-tony.luck@intel.com

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.

The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:

	struct bug_entry {
		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes
		signed int      file_disp;	// 4 bytes
		unsigned short  line;		// 2 bytes
		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes
	}

... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:

	struct bug_entry {
		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes
		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes
		< implicit padding >		// 2 bytes
	}

... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.

When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.

For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:

	for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
		if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
			return bug;

However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:

	mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);

... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:

	sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
	sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;

	sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;

Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:

	for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
		if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
			goto out;

... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.

This can be demonstrated with the following module:

	static int __init buginit(void)
	{
		WARN(1, "hello\n");
		return 0;
	}

	static void __exit bugexit(void)
	{
	}

	module_init(buginit);
	module_exit(bugexit);
	MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:

	------------[ cut here ]------------
	hello
	Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
	Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
	Modules linked in: hello(O+)
	CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O       6.9.1 #8
	Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
	pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
	pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	sp : ffff800080533ae0
	x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
	x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
	x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
	x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
	x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
	x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
	x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
	x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
	x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
	x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
	Call trace:
	 buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	 do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
	 do_init_module+0x60/0x218
	 load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
	 __do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
	 __arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
	 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
	 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
	 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
	 el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
	 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
	 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
	Code: d0ffffe0 910003fd 91000000 9400000b (d4210000)
	---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
	Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception

Fix this by always aligning the end of a bug_entry to 4 bytes, which is
correct regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE.

Fixes: 9fb7410f ("arm64/BUG: Use BRK instruction for generic BUG traps")

Signed-off-by: Yuanbin Xie <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1716212077-43826-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com


Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The ACPI specification clearly states how the processors should be
enumerated in the MADT:

 "To ensure that the boot processor is supported post initialization,
  two guidelines should be followed. The first is that OSPM should
  initialize processors in the order that they appear in the MADT. The
  second is that platform firmware should list the boot processor as the
  first processor entry in the MADT.
  ...
  Failure of OSPM implementations and platform firmware to abide by
  these guidelines can result in both unpredictable and non optimal
  platform operation."

The kernel relies on that ordering to detect the real BSP on crash kernels
which is important to avoid sending a INIT IPI to it as that would cause a
full machine reset.

On a Dell XPS 16 9640 the BIOS ignores this rule and enumerates the CPUs in
the wrong order. As a consequence the kernel falsely detects a crash kernel
and disables the corresponding CPU.

Prevent this by checking the IA32_APICBASE MSR for the BSP bit on the boot
CPU. If that bit is set, then the MADT based BSP detection can be safely
ignored. If the kernel detects a mismatch between the BSP bit and the first
enumerated MADT entry then emit a firmware bug message.

This obviously also has to be taken into account when the boot APIC ID and
the first enumerated APIC ID match. If the boot CPU does not have the BSP
bit set in the APICBASE MSR then there is no way for the boot CPU to
determine which of the CPUs is the real BSP. Sending an INIT to the real
BSP would reset the machine so the only sane way to deal with that is to
limit the number of CPUs to one and emit a corresponding warning message.

Fixes: 5c5682b9 ("x86/cpu: Detect real BSP on crash kernels")
Reported-by: Carsten Tolkmit <ctolkmit@ennit.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Carsten Tolkmit <ctolkmit@ennit.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87le48jycb.ffs@tglx
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218837

Commit 2fd001cd ("arch: Rename fbdev header and source files")
renames the video source files under arch/ such that they do not
refer to fbdev any longer. The new files named video.o conflict with
ACPI's video.ko module. Modprobing the ACPI module can then fail with
warnings about missing symbols, as shown below.

  (i915_selftest:1107) igt_kmod-WARNING: i915: Unknown symbol acpi_video_unregister (err -2)
  (i915_selftest:1107) igt_kmod-WARNING: i915: Unknown symbol acpi_video_register_backlight (err -2)
  (i915_selftest:1107) igt_kmod-WARNING: i915: Unknown symbol __acpi_video_get_backlight_type (err -2)
  (i915_selftest:1107) igt_kmod-WARNING: i915: Unknown symbol acpi_video_register (err -2)

Fix the issue by renaming the architecture's video.o to video-common.o.

Reported-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/intel-gfx/9dcac6e9-a3bf-4ace-bbdc-f697f767f9e0@suse.de/T/#t


Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Fixes: 2fd001cd ("arch: Rename fbdev header and source files")
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

It took me some time to understand the purpose of the tricky code at
the end of arch/x86/Kconfig.debug.

Without it, the following would be shown:

  WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for FRAME_POINTER

because

  81d38719 ("x86/kconfig: Consolidate unwinders into multiple choice selection")

removed 'select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS'.

The correct and more straightforward approach should have been to move
it where 'select FRAME_POINTER' is located.

Several architectures properly handle the conditional selection of
ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS. For example, 'config UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER'
in arch/arm/Kconfig.debug.

Fixes: 81d38719 ("x86/kconfig: Consolidate unwinders into multiple choice selection")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204122003.53795-1-masahiroy@kernel.org

This is motivated by the amdgpu DRM driver, which needs floating-point
code to support recent hardware.  That code is not performance-critical,
so only provide a minimal non-preemptible implementation for now.

Support is limited to riscv64 because riscv32 requires runtime (libgcc)
assistance to convert between doubles and 64-bit integers.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-12-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

x86 already provides kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end(), but in a
different header.  Add a wrapper header, and export the CFLAGS adjustments
as found in lib/Makefile.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-11-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

PowerPC provides an equivalent to the common kernel-mode FPU API, but in a
different header and using different function names.  The PowerPC API also
requires a non-preemptible context.  Add a wrapper header, and export the
CFLAGS adjustments.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-9-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

LoongArch already provides kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end() in
asm/fpu.h, so it only needs to add kernel_fpu_available() and export the
CFLAGS adjustments.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-8-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Acked-by: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Now that CC_FLAGS_FPU is exported and can be used anywhere in the source
tree, use it instead of duplicating the flags here.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-6-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

arm64 provides an equivalent to the common kernel-mode FPU API, but in a
different header and using different function names.  Add a wrapper
header, and export CFLAGS adjustments as found in lib/raid6/Makefile.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-5-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Now that CC_FLAGS_FPU is exported and can be used anywhere in the source
tree, use it instead of duplicating the flags here.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-4-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

ARM provides an equivalent to the common kernel-mode FPU API, but in a
different header and using different function names.  Add a wrapper
header, and export CFLAGS adjustments as found in lib/raid6/Makefile.

[samuel.holland@sifive.com: ARM: do not select ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240509013727.648600-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-3-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Several architectures provide an API to enable the FPU and run
floating-point SIMD code in kernel space.  However, the function names,
header locations, and semantics are inconsistent across architectures, and
FPU support may be gated behind other Kconfig options.

provide a standard way for architectures to declare that kernel space
FPU support is available. Architectures selecting this option must
implement what is currently the most common API (kernel_fpu_begin() and
kernel_fpu_end(), plus a new function kernel_fpu_available()) and
provide the appropriate CFLAGS for compiling floating-point C code.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-2-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "Unified cross-architecture kernel-mode FPU API", v4.

This series unifies the kernel-mode FPU API across several architectures
by wrapping the existing functions (where needed) in consistently-named
functions placed in a consistent header location, with mostly the same
semantics: they can be called from preemptible or non-preemptible task
context, and are not assumed to be reentrant.  Architectures are also
expected to provide CFLAGS adjustments for compiling FPU-dependent code. 
For the moment, SIMD/vector units are out of scope for this common API.

This allows us to remove the ifdeffery and duplicated Makefile logic at
each FPU user.  It then implements the common API on RISC-V, and converts
a couple of users to the new API: the AMDGPU DRM driver, and the FPU self
test.

The underlying goal of this series is to allow using newer AMD GPUs (e.g. 
Navi) on RISC-V boards such as SiFive's HiFive Unmatched.  Those GPUs need
CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_FP to initialize, which requires kernel-mode FPU
support.


This patch (of 15):

The include guard should match the filename, or it will conflict with
the newly-added asm/fpu.h.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-10-samuel.holland@sifive.com


Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>