diff --git a/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch b/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b373ce07dd9e04546214cf0b7eda09012e21048c..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-From: Steven Schweda
-Subject: Handle the PKWare verification bit of internal attributes
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630078
-X-Debian-version: 6.0-5
-
---- a/process.c
-+++ b/process.c
-@@ -1729,6 +1729,13 @@
- else if (uO.L_flag > 1) /* let -LL force lower case for all names */
- G.pInfo->lcflag = 1;
-
-+ /* Handle the PKWare verification bit, bit 2 (0x0004) of internal
-+ attributes. If this is set, then a verification checksum is in the
-+ first 3 bytes of the external attributes. In this case all we can use
-+ for setting file attributes is the last external attributes byte. */
-+ if (G.crec.internal_file_attributes & 0x0004)
-+ G.crec.external_file_attributes &= (ulg)0xff;
-+
- /* do Amigas (AMIGA_) also have volume labels? */
- if (IS_VOLID(G.crec.external_file_attributes) &&
- (G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_FAT_ || G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_HPFS_ ||
diff --git a/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch b/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3a308990e18538a91b4057b8f975a185a01ab5dc..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: sms
-Subject: Restore uid and gid information when requested
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/689212
-X-Debian-version: 6.0-8
-
---- a/process.c
-+++ b/process.c
-@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@
- #ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
- if (eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN
- && z_uidgid != NULL
-- && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1)
-+ && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1))
- /* only know about version 1 */
- {
- uch uid_size;
-@@ -2916,10 +2916,10 @@
- flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */
-
- if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf,
-- uid_size, z_uidgid[0])
-+ uid_size, &z_uidgid[0])
- &&
- read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 3) + ef_buf,
-- gid_size, z_uidgid[1]) )
-+ gid_size, &z_uidgid[1]) )
- {
- flags |= EB_UX2_VALID; /* signal success */
- }
diff --git a/system/unzip/APKBUILD b/system/unzip/APKBUILD
index e915966a0a9f47b5689e4ae0ee12e291160ace2e..ea8f7e6faaffedca4258663e9791ea78f3926af3 100644
--- a/system/unzip/APKBUILD
+++ b/system/unzip/APKBUILD
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
pkgname=unzip
pkgver=6.0
_pkgver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr -d .)
-pkgrel=3
+_debver=25
+pkgrel=4
pkgdesc="Extract PKZIP-compatible .zip files"
url="http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html"
arch="all"
@@ -12,12 +13,30 @@ license="Info-ZIP"
subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
# normally ftp://ftp.info-zip.org/pub/infozip/src/$pkgname$_pkgver.zip
source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://distfiles.adelielinux.org/source/$pkgname$_pkgver.tgz
- 10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
- 20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
- unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
+ http://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/u/unzip/unzip_$pkgver-$_debver.debian.tar.xz
"
builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname$_pkgver"
+# secfixes:
+# 6.0-r4:
+# - CVE-2014-8139
+# - CVE-2014-8140
+# - CVE-2014-8141
+# - CVE-2014-9636
+# - CVE-2014-9913
+# - CVE-2016-9844
+# - CVE-2018-18384
+# - CVE-2018-1000035
+# - CVE-2019-13232
+
+prepare() {
+ default_prepare
+ while read -r i; do
+ msg "$i"
+ patch -p1 -i "../debian/patches/$i"
+ done < ../debian/patches/series
+}
+
build() {
make -f unix/Makefile \
CC="${CHOST}-gcc" \
@@ -38,6 +57,4 @@ package() {
}
sha512sums="0694e403ebc57b37218e00ec1a406cae5cc9c5b52b6798e0d4590840b6cdbf9ddc0d9471f67af783e960f8fa2e620394d51384257dca23d06bcd90224a80ce5d unzip-6.0.tgz
-9d2914f22fb0075a2b6f72825c235f46eafd8d47b6fb6fcc8303fc69336e256b15923c002d2615bb6af733344c2315e4a8504d77bae301e10c11d4736faa2c81 10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
-57699582e9056af0817dcb67f8db67e6a1ff8208c137fbebcf559429e5f12b471b75d7e1ef938e5bbb5416074a51ac7342e4ce8057f4bbdcb0bf079b8d7832af 20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
-b1e3fac6a787828efaaef8ec7cc52e1573aea27a6f29830af37ec4ba8bcd2a6488c953ab10eee0561c78e82c7401833ef172bebee793405d93632ce788756301 unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch"
+13c16db420fa4a34be3090a9acdd79b01320da40ac5aa89a9dfca03e64b914b28eb72aff3882d02a8197457bcb8eeb9473c998cf6920e511883c9289a949fb21 unzip_6.0-25.debian.tar.xz"
diff --git a/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch b/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 160c512f96b7c3d4de85758171dcc294ad132ef8..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
----
- crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
-index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
---- a/crypt.c
-+++ b/crypt.c
-@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
- GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
- defer_leftover_input(__G);
- for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
-- b = NEXTBYTE;
-+ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
-+ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
-+ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
-+ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
-+ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
-+ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
-+ */
-+ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
-+ {
-+ return PK_ERR;
-+ }
- h[n] = (uch)b;
- Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
- }
---
-2.4.6
-
-
-From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
-
-Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
----
- extract.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
-index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
---- a/extract.c
-+++ b/extract.c
-@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
- int repeated_buf_err;
- bz_stream bstrm;
-
-+ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
-+ /* avoid an infinite loop */
-+ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
- #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
- if (G.redirect_slide)
- wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
---
-2.4.6
-
-
-From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
-
-Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
----
- extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
-index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
---- a/extract.c
-+++ b/extract.c
-@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
- if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
- zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
-
-- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
-+ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
-+ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
-+ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
-+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
-+ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
-+ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
-+ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
-+ return PK_ERR;
-+ }
- csiz_decrypted -= 12;
-+ }
- if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
- LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
---
-2.5.2
-