Verified Commit 9f0f9cf4 authored by Max Rees's avatar Max Rees
Browse files

user/sox: patch multiple CVEs (#166)

parent d1794250
......@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Maintainer:
pkgname=sox
pkgver=14.4.2
pkgrel=1
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Convert between various audio formats"
url="http://sox.sourceforge.net/"
arch="all"
......@@ -15,10 +15,38 @@ makedepends="alsa-lib-dev ffmpeg-dev file-dev flac-dev gsm-dev lame-dev
depends=""
subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc"
source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
CVE-2017-11332.patch
CVE-2017-11358.patch
CVE-2017-11359.patch
CVE-2017-15370.patch
CVE-2017-15371.patch
CVE-2017-15372.patch
CVE-2017-15642.patch
CVE-2017-18189.patch
CVE-2019-13590.patch
CVE-2019-8354.patch
CVE-2019-8355.patch
CVE-2019-8356.patch
CVE-2019-8357.patch
disable-pipe-file-detection.patch
sox-dynamic.patch
"
# secfixes:
# 14.4.2-r2:
# - CVE-2017-11332
# - CVE-2017-11358
# - CVE-2017-11359
# - CVE-2017-15370
# - CVE-2017-15371
# - CVE-2017-15372
# - CVE-2017-15642
# - CVE-2017-18189
# - CVE-2019-13590
# - CVE-2019-8354
# - CVE-2019-8355
# - CVE-2019-8356
# - CVE-2019-8357
prepare() {
default_prepare
autoreconf -vif
......@@ -43,5 +71,17 @@ package() {
}
sha512sums="b5c6203f4f5577503a034fe5b3d6a033ee97fe4d171c533933e2b036118a43a14f97c9668433229708609ccf9ee16abdeca3fc7501aa0aafe06baacbba537eca sox-14.4.2.tar.gz
eb90574a7c174a32ac77aa09a2bb4ebbea407463517e55943e16efd8b7c52393c6b7a6b2778d696f708627271f4d2212221a85fc50d2500b32143139a37a957a disable-pipe-file-detection.patch
3950834db26faa0523006c6fd8e0769d080518f127d345c8ec9bf53e9db8a6bd67cd724f0f86492aaf9ce6ede2dfbde167049768f35c14ef3c2b96e7e00302b6 sox-dynamic.patch"
b4bded0b15a2243fbb404a33fccf45ad5634d6c6e0f60b49b967592f00ff9bc3657ebcfa42b18a5af804e7f04a700773bece5951739b8206b2c68c46c9ec4c7f CVE-2017-11332.patch
28ffd5eef149563a1cdfcd920a89a0e2247ddbf4ed10a76c4e34ee57e3a30ec3a98bacf53fe1675da1431dd40c30b13cae0b9a1e26153c1aad6144322b7d78b0 CVE-2017-11358.patch
2c95d85f94877bf1637d2c1297944a77a8854506cad35b1c0d632237133cd970da82cded817696b19acde25b0e570f4c86659cc362a910e4ea76a037e3e56214 CVE-2017-11359.patch
bcbfd0785751372cd959a7419d88af24bb041dd02d3d0cf2f0dab46b6f6b55f284c1d823d20e5a0eae15191f3ccb2eefa2026287fdfbecb064722b006970ee00 CVE-2017-15370.patch
b116887f52eb4b70de9dda5f14e581579c4c1755c39100d88c4b8645bf9e053cfe87de3346eb138edc45fd2c36f0e1755f91e09511d279fe6d4661099c578420 CVE-2017-15371.patch
f8a4d38cfad80a50b9c758b222d83f6b51d96f1491862680e1632eec2a5c2a7c6f968660307f0f403e0b7537f7da19a510945648bdef8f1302fd4683be869581 CVE-2017-15372.patch
259980ea6fe08a2481a478a4a21b11a7fc4390b1b53023009d85fb2185ee63c42d2762e024af20912e7277688fac98e4eaa66b4a4e79840517ff2481ad50327e CVE-2017-15642.patch
de510114a9fbbbabe62149f3c22ebd1fae65ed68e6ed0b818f367bbee806c9e04be6db0c8e64f4985b7bd95dd0cc643e1475767fda4e405931f25104b4a2e39f CVE-2017-18189.patch
eab27e22035bdbe00d0dc4117f98bf9c5dcad4513a27e0e8a83506b94fca8055bc6ce532d24306aa8434942bef111b3511daf260df56fafb7b4ac5ed2075e3f7 CVE-2019-13590.patch
61342fad71dbe7f0ff10a7327eeed901c0defd5aafaace4ac755032ccf687d875856490c30f2af050823fd6ff1a1c7f503ae26670225eab916ab59fa857a8cb3 CVE-2019-8354.patch
3f05ab71680a67c9e8a4b33c70cb19a623f0925a2620ab007dc8d4a82caf5b73b50e3e5d40e242d6f65420d444b91e11bee09e4398e8079ca4af60bd34097593 CVE-2019-8355.patch
6eca5096c658a61939902a70d218b5662b663df84173d09d5b23f497bdcb81c04cd94d8debed2818079c342cec80ec29ff33d572611826bdbc12a5d465a20241 CVE-2019-8356.patch
82fbbf62a7124248ce74cf0daab0cd224a3da80e62923db58b8be31c4f145abe0e653f6968d0f6b862e5554d080d0f85b0bc0bcdb6dea34c130aa4ee9106d915 CVE-2019-8357.patch
eb90574a7c174a32ac77aa09a2bb4ebbea407463517e55943e16efd8b7c52393c6b7a6b2778d696f708627271f4d2212221a85fc50d2500b32143139a37a957a disable-pipe-file-detection.patch"
From 6e177c455fb554327ff8125b6e6dde1568610abe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:29:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] wav: fix crash if channel count is zero (CVE-2017-11332)
---
src/wav.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c
index 5202556c..71fd52ac 100644
--- a/src/wav.c
+++ b/src/wav.c
@@ -712,6 +712,11 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
else
lsx_report("User options overriding channels read in .wav header");
+ if (ft->signal.channels == 0) {
+ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "Channel count is zero");
+ return SOX_EOF;
+ }
+
if (ft->signal.rate == 0 || ft->signal.rate == dwSamplesPerSecond)
ft->signal.rate = dwSamplesPerSecond;
else
--
2.25.0
From e410d00c4821726accfbe1f825f2def6376e181f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:43:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] hcom: fix crash on input with corrupt dictionary
(CVE-2017-11358)
---
src/hcom.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/hcom.c b/src/hcom.c
index e76820e9..be17d9d2 100644
--- a/src/hcom.c
+++ b/src/hcom.c
@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ typedef struct {
size_t pos; /* Where next byte goes */
} priv_t;
+static int dictvalid(int n, int size, int left, int right)
+{
+ if (n > 0 && left < 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return (unsigned)left < size && (unsigned)right < size;
+}
+
static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
{
priv_t *p = (priv_t *) ft->priv;
@@ -150,6 +158,11 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
lsx_debug("%d %d",
p->dictionary[i].dict_leftson,
p->dictionary[i].dict_rightson);
+ if (!dictvalid(i, dictsize, p->dictionary[i].dict_leftson,
+ p->dictionary[i].dict_rightson)) {
+ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "Invalid dictionary");
+ return SOX_EOF;
+ }
}
rc = lsx_skipbytes(ft, (size_t) 1); /* skip pad byte */
if (rc)
--
2.25.0
From 7b3f30e13e4845bafc93215a372c6eb7dcf04118 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 17:02:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] wav: fix crash writing header when channel count >64k
(CVE-2017-11359)
---
src/wav.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c
index 71fd52ac..eca1cde5 100644
--- a/src/wav.c
+++ b/src/wav.c
@@ -1379,6 +1379,12 @@ static int wavwritehdr(sox_format_t * ft, int second_header)
long blocksWritten = 0;
sox_bool isExtensible = sox_false; /* WAVE_FORMAT_EXTENSIBLE? */
+ if (ft->signal.channels > UINT16_MAX) {
+ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EOF, "Too many channels (%u)",
+ ft->signal.channels);
+ return SOX_EOF;
+ }
+
dwSamplesPerSecond = ft->signal.rate;
wChannels = ft->signal.channels;
wBitsPerSample = ft->encoding.bits_per_sample;
--
2.25.0
From e076a7ad504add6e8c3b8699e8587eef0e0d9bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:21:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] wav: ima_adpcm: fix buffer overflow on corrupt input
(CVE-2017-15370)
Add the same check bad block size as was done for MS adpcm in commit
f39c574b ("More checks for invalid MS ADPCM blocks").
---
src/wav.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c
index eca1cde5..fad334cf 100644
--- a/src/wav.c
+++ b/src/wav.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static unsigned short ImaAdpcmReadBlock(sox_format_t * ft)
/* work with partial blocks. Specs say it should be null */
/* padded but I guess this is better than trailing quiet. */
samplesThisBlock = lsx_ima_samples_in((size_t)0, (size_t)ft->signal.channels, bytesRead, (size_t) 0);
- if (samplesThisBlock == 0)
+ if (samplesThisBlock == 0 || samplesThisBlock > wav->samplesPerBlock)
{
lsx_warn("Premature EOF on .wav input file");
return 0;
--
2.25.0
From 968c689ad2c4269a1a853434d99aa7ebf0c01354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 15:57:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] flac: fix crash on corrupt metadata (CVE-2017-15371)
---
src/flac.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/flac.c b/src/flac.c
index 0d7829ec..07f45c1b 100644
--- a/src/flac.c
+++ b/src/flac.c
@@ -119,9 +119,10 @@ static void decoder_metadata_callback(FLAC__StreamDecoder const * const flac, FL
p->total_samples = metadata->data.stream_info.total_samples;
}
else if (metadata->type == FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_VORBIS_COMMENT) {
+ const FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment *vc = &metadata->data.vorbis_comment;
size_t i;
- if (metadata->data.vorbis_comment.num_comments == 0)
+ if (vc->num_comments == 0)
return;
if (ft->oob.comments != NULL) {
@@ -129,8 +130,9 @@ static void decoder_metadata_callback(FLAC__StreamDecoder const * const flac, FL
return;
}
- for (i = 0; i < metadata->data.vorbis_comment.num_comments; ++i)
- sox_append_comment(&ft->oob.comments, (char const *) metadata->data.vorbis_comment.comments[i].entry);
+ for (i = 0; i < vc->num_comments; ++i)
+ if (vc->comments[i].entry)
+ sox_append_comment(&ft->oob.comments, (char const *) vc->comments[i].entry);
}
}
--
2.25.0
From 515b986139183326cc40c67c75f83edc60826a9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 00:27:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] adpcm: fix stack overflow with >4 channels (CVE-2017-15372)
---
src/adpcm.c | 8 +++++++-
src/adpcm.h | 3 +++
src/wav.c | 5 ++++-
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/adpcm.c b/src/adpcm.c
index 2e13867e..f64b7d5c 100644
--- a/src/adpcm.c
+++ b/src/adpcm.c
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ const short lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coef[7][2] = {
{ 392,-232}
};
+extern void *lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(unsigned chans)
+{
+ return lsx_malloc(chans * sizeof(MsState_t));
+}
+
static inline sox_sample_t AdpcmDecode(sox_sample_t c, MsState_t *state,
sox_sample_t sample1, sox_sample_t sample2)
{
@@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ static inline sox_sample_t AdpcmDecode(sox_sample_t c, MsState_t *state,
/* lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i() outputs interleaved samples into one output buffer */
const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(
+ void *priv,
unsigned chans, /* total channels */
int nCoef,
const short *coef,
@@ -113,7 +119,7 @@ const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(
const unsigned char *ip;
unsigned ch;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
- MsState_t state[4]; /* One decompressor state for each channel */
+ MsState_t *state = priv; /* One decompressor state for each channel */
/* Read the four-byte header for each channel */
ip = ibuff;
diff --git a/src/adpcm.h b/src/adpcm.h
index af4d6f08..db5cc615 100644
--- a/src/adpcm.h
+++ b/src/adpcm.h
@@ -29,8 +29,11 @@
/* default coef sets */
extern const short lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coef[7][2];
+extern void *lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(unsigned chans);
+
/* lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i() outputs interleaved samples into one output buffer */
extern const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(
+ void *priv,
unsigned chans, /* total channels */
int nCoef,
const short *coef,
diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c
index fad334cf..066be6d7 100644
--- a/src/wav.c
+++ b/src/wav.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ typedef struct {
/* following used by *ADPCM wav files */
unsigned short nCoefs; /* ADPCM: number of coef sets */
short *lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs; /* ADPCM: coef sets */
+ void *ms_adpcm_data; /* Private data of adpcm decoder */
unsigned char *packet; /* Temporary buffer for packets */
short *samples; /* interleaved samples buffer */
short *samplePtr; /* Pointer to current sample */
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static unsigned short AdpcmReadBlock(sox_format_t * ft)
}
}
- errmsg = lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(ft->signal.channels, wav->nCoefs, wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs, wav->packet, wav->samples, samplesThisBlock);
+ errmsg = lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(wav->ms_adpcm_data, ft->signal.channels, wav->nCoefs, wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs, wav->packet, wav->samples, samplesThisBlock);
if (errmsg)
lsx_warn("%s", errmsg);
@@ -791,6 +792,7 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
/* nCoefs, lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs used by adpcm.c */
wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs = lsx_malloc(wav->nCoefs * 2 * sizeof(short));
+ wav->ms_adpcm_data = lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(wChannels);
{
int i, errct=0;
for (i=0; len>=2 && i < 2*wav->nCoefs; i++) {
@@ -1216,6 +1218,7 @@ static int stopread(sox_format_t * ft)
free(wav->packet);
free(wav->samples);
free(wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs);
+ free(wav->ms_adpcm_data);
free(wav->comment);
wav->comment = NULL;
--
2.25.0
From f56c0dbca8f5bd02ea88970c248c0d087386e807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 11:03:15 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] aiff: fix crash on empty comment chunk (CVE-2017-15642)
This fixes a use after free and double free if an empty comment
chunk follows a non-empty one.
---
src/aiff.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/aiff.c b/src/aiff.c
index 240d2e1f..11ddb542 100644
--- a/src/aiff.c
+++ b/src/aiff.c
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ int lsx_aiffstartread(sox_format_t * ft)
size_t ssndsize = 0;
char *annotation;
char *author;
- char *comment = NULL;
char *copyright;
char *nametext;
@@ -270,6 +269,7 @@ int lsx_aiffstartread(sox_format_t * ft)
free(annotation);
}
else if (strncmp(buf, "COMT", (size_t)4) == 0) {
+ char *comment = NULL;
rc = commentChunk(&comment, "Comment:", ft);
if (rc) {
/* Fail already called in function */
--
2.25.0
From 09d7388c8ad5701ed9c59d1d600ff6154b066397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 11:45:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xa: validate channel count (CVE-2017-18189)
A corrupt header specifying zero channels would send read_channels()
into an infinite loop. Prevent this by sanity checking the channel
count in open_read(). Also add an upper bound to prevent overflow
in multiplication.
---
src/xa.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/xa.c b/src/xa.c
index 81a76772..9fc086ec 100644
--- a/src/xa.c
+++ b/src/xa.c
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
lsx_report("User options overriding rate read in .xa header");
}
+ if (ft->signal.channels == 0 || ft->signal.channels > UINT16_MAX) {
+ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "invalid channel count %d",
+ ft->signal.channels);
+ return SOX_EOF;
+ }
+
/* Check for supported formats */
if (ft->encoding.bits_per_sample != 16) {
lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "%d-bit sample resolution not supported.",
--
2.25.0
From 7b6a889217d62ed7e28188621403cc7542fd1f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 12:55:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] sox-fmt: validate comments_bytes before use (CVE-2019-13590)
[bug #325]
Cap the comments size to 1 GB to avoid overflows in subsequent
arithmetic.
The missing null check mentioned in the bug report is bogus since
lsx_calloc() returns a valid pointer or aborts.
---
src/sox-fmt.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/sox-fmt.c b/src/sox-fmt.c
index aad965cd..11c88771 100644
--- a/src/sox-fmt.c
+++ b/src/sox-fmt.c
@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
lsx_readdw(ft, &comments_bytes))
return SOX_EOF;
- if (((headers_bytes + 4) & 7) || headers_bytes < FIXED_HDR + comments_bytes ||
+ if (((headers_bytes + 4) & 7) ||
+ comments_bytes > 0x40000000 || /* max 1 GB */
+ headers_bytes < FIXED_HDR + comments_bytes ||
(num_channels > 65535)) /* Reserve top 16 bits */ {
lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "invalid sox file format header");
return SOX_EOF;
--
2.25.0
From f70911261a84333b077c29908e1242f69d7439eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 14:57:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix possible buffer size overflow in lsx_make_lpf()
(CVE-2019-8354)
The multiplication in the size argument malloc() might overflow,
resulting in a small buffer being allocated. Use calloc() instead.
---
src/effects_i_dsp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/effects_i_dsp.c b/src/effects_i_dsp.c
index a979b501..e32dfa05 100644
--- a/src/effects_i_dsp.c
+++ b/src/effects_i_dsp.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ double * lsx_make_lpf(int num_taps, double Fc, double beta, double rho,
double scale, sox_bool dc_norm)
{
int i, m = num_taps - 1;
- double * h = malloc(num_taps * sizeof(*h)), sum = 0;
+ double * h = calloc(num_taps, sizeof(*h)), sum = 0;
double mult = scale / lsx_bessel_I_0(beta), mult1 = 1 / (.5 * m + rho);
assert(Fc >= 0 && Fc <= 1);
lsx_debug("make_lpf(n=%i Fc=%.7g β=%g ρ=%g dc-norm=%i scale=%g)", num_taps, Fc, beta, rho, dc_norm, scale);
--
2.25.0
Backport of the following:
From ec073861aa9c0f779a3741c456e4f97d59366ffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 15:40:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] make: update exported symbol list [bug #266]
From f8587e2d50dad72d40453ac1191c539ee9e50381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 17:39:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix possible overflow in lsx_(re)valloc() size calculation
(CVE-2019-8355)
--- a/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ libsox_la_LIBADD += @GOMP_LIBS@
libsox_la_CFLAGS = @WARN_CFLAGS@
libsox_la_LDFLAGS = @APP_LDFLAGS@ -version-info @SHLIB_VERSION@ \
- -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|realloc|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$'
+ -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(([cm]|re)alloc.*|check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|error|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|flush|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|strdup|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$'
if HAVE_WIN32_LTDL
libsox_la_SOURCES += win32-ltdl.c win32-ltdl.h
--- sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.c 2012-01-23 16:27:33.000000000 -0600
+++ sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.c 2020-03-21 13:24:52.660007611 -0500
@@ -41,3 +41,13 @@ void *lsx_realloc(void *ptr, size_t news
return ptr;
}
+
+void *lsx_realloc_array(void *p, size_t n, size_t size)
+{
+ if (n > (size_t)-1 / size) {
+ lsx_fail("malloc size overflow");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ return lsx_realloc(p, n * size);
+}
--- sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.h 2012-01-23 16:27:33.000000000 -0600
+++ sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.h 2020-03-21 13:24:14.610007203 -0500
@@ -23,12 +23,14 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
+LSX_RETURN_VALID void *lsx_realloc_array(void *p, size_t n, size_t size);
+
#define lsx_malloc(size) lsx_realloc(NULL, (size))
#define lsx_calloc(n,s) (((n)*(s))? memset(lsx_malloc((n)*(s)),0,(n)*(s)) : NULL)
#define lsx_Calloc(v,n) v = lsx_calloc(n,sizeof(*(v)))
#define lsx_strdup(p) ((p)? strcpy((char *)lsx_malloc(strlen(p) + 1), p) : NULL)
#define lsx_memdup(p,s) ((p)? memcpy(lsx_malloc(s), p, s) : NULL)
-#define lsx_valloc(v,n) v = lsx_malloc((n)*sizeof(*(v)))
-#define lsx_revalloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc(v, (n)*sizeof(*(v)))
+#define lsx_valloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc_array(NULL, n, sizeof(*(v)))
+#define lsx_revalloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc_array(v, n, sizeof(*(v)))
#endif
From b7883ae1398499daaa926ae6621f088f0f531ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 16:56:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fft4g: bail if size too large (CVE-2019-8356)
Prevent overflowing of fixed-size buffers in bitrv2() and bitrv2conj()
if the transform size is too large.
---
src/fft4g.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
src/fft4g.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/fft4g.c b/src/fft4g.c
index 38a8bcc0..88a2a7ec 100644
--- a/src/fft4g.c
+++ b/src/fft4g.c
@@ -322,6 +322,9 @@ static void rftfsub(int n, double *a, int nc, double const *c);
void cdft(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w)
{
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
if (n > (ip[0] << 2)) {
makewt(n >> 2, ip, w);
}
@@ -344,6 +347,9 @@ void rdft(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w)
int nw, nc;
double xi;
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
nw = ip[0];
if (n > (nw << 2)) {
nw = n >> 2;
@@ -384,6 +390,9 @@ void ddct(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w)
int j, nw, nc;
double xr;
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
nw = ip[0];
if (n > (nw << 2)) {
nw = n >> 2;
@@ -435,6 +444,9 @@ void ddst(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w)
int j, nw, nc;
double xr;
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
nw = ip[0];
if (n > (nw << 2)) {
nw = n >> 2;
@@ -486,6 +498,9 @@ void dfct(int n, double *a, double *t, int *ip, double *w)
int j, k, l, m, mh, nw, nc;
double xr, xi, yr, yi;
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
nw = ip[0];
if (n > (nw << 3)) {
nw = n >> 3;
@@ -576,6 +591,9 @@ void dfst(int n, double *a, double *t, int *ip, double *w)
int j, k, l, m, mh, nw, nc;
double xr, xi, yr, yi;
+ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE)
+ return;
+
nw = ip[0];
if (n > (nw << 3)) {
nw = n >> 3;
diff --git a/src/fft4g.h b/src/fft4g.h
index 2b8051ca..95ee3413 100644
--- a/src/fft4g.h
+++ b/src/fft4g.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
* Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*/
+#define FFT4G_MAX_SIZE 262144
+
void lsx_cdft(int, int, double *, int *, double *);
void lsx_rdft(int, int, double *, int *, double *);
void lsx_ddct(int, int, double *, int *, double *);
--
2.25.0
From 2ce02fea7b350de9ddfbcf542ba4dd59a8ab255b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 15:08:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix possible null pointer deref in lsx_make_lpf()
(CVE-2019-8357)
If the buffer allocation fails, return NULL.
---
src/effects_i_dsp.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)